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“Illegal” Migration Is Speech*
DANIEL I. MORALES†
Noncitizens must comply with immigration laws just because citizens say so. The
citizenry takes for granted its monopoly on immigration control, but the legitimacy
of this arrangement has been called into question by cutting-edge political theorists.
One prominent theorist argues, for example, that basic democratic principles require
that noncitizens living outside the United States have a say in the formation of immigration law since they must obey it. This Article provides a legal response to these
political theory developments, assimilating them, along with the facts on the ground,
into an account of “illegal” migration as First Amendment speech.
If noncitizens’ voices are unjustly excluded from the immigration law conversation, then “illegal” migration is speech of necessity—there is no other way for
noncitizens to be heard. Protest speech occurs every time a migrant crosses a border
without permission and every time a noncitizen chooses to overstay a visa: these
defiant actions declare the illegitimacy of immigration law. In turn, the individual
speech acts of millions of “illegal” migrants help to foment an immigrants’ rights
consciousness and enable groups of migrants to engage in core, protected forms of
dissent, like marching in the streets shouting “NOT ONE MORE DEPORTATION”
and tweeting #Not1More.
By speaking in these disruptive and unorthodox ways, the undocumented force the
citizenry to grapple with the serious constriction of noncitizens’ lives that immigration laws cause. If these millions of protesters had respected our immigration laws
by staying at home, pining for—but failing to seize—a better life in the United States,
citizens could not know concretely how immigration laws limit noncitizens’ lives, nor
learn whether our legal and political system is resilient enough to accommodate millions of people the citizenry did not ask for. Thus, “illegal” migration makes the
immigration law conversation more consistent with American free-speech values
than it would otherwise be.
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INTRODUCTION
“Illegal”1 migration2 is an act that speaks.3 It speaks a dissent from a noncitizen’s
exclusion from the United States. Because migrating without permission speaks this
message and lays the groundwork for traditional protest movements—like the
DREAMers4 (an immigrants’ rights group led by undocumented people brought to
the United States as children) and #Not1More[Deportation] 5 (an organization

1. On nomenclature: I use the term “illegal” migration interchangeably with undocumented migration throughout. I place “illegal” in quotation marks to reflect my agreement
with critiques of that label which render ambiguous the state’s right to so label a person who
migrates without permission. I utilize “illegal,” rather than rely exclusively on undocumented,
irregular, or unauthorized migration because the speech theory of “illegal” migration offers a
way for the act of “illegal” migration to fundamentally challenge the state’s legal right to so
label a person. I also use the term alien, which most scholars have eschewed in favor of
noncitizen, a term I also use. I use alien to mirror the terminology in immigration statutes and
as a means of engaging readers who have not already accepted critiques of the sharp legal
distinctions drawn between aliens and citizens. Alien also carries a connotation of foreignness
which dovetails with the argument I make about noncitizens’ formal exclusion—alienation
—from the polity. By using these terms I aim to emphasize the reality that these categories
exist and have force while critiquing the government’s ability to make good on those
categories without the consent and voice of aliens themselves.
2. In this paper “illegal” migration refers to the acts of knowingly crossing the border
without permission, knowingly overstaying visas, or otherwise knowingly seeking to avoid
immigration authorities in cases where a migrant knows he is deportable.
3. See infra Part II (illustrating how the act of migrating without permission can be conceptualized as speech).
4. The DREAMers are undocumented people born outside the United States, but raised
and reared in the United States. See infra Part II.B
5. See infra Part II.C (discussing immigrants’ rights movements).
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demanding the cessation of all deportations)—it is a constructive force.6
“Illegal” migration is not a simple sign of legal breakdown, this Article argues; it
is also a mechanism for the formation of a more democratically legitimate immigration law, law that considers the voices of those subject to it—aliens—not just those
of the citizens who enforce and author it.7 The persuasive force of undocumented
migrants’ speech is reflected in President Obama’s executive actions on immigration,
which have modified immigration enforcement practices to make it easier to remain
in the United States without permission. 8
This Article is the first to advance a speech theory of “illegal” migration. Unlike
other arguments that explain why “illegal” migration is more than simply
lawbreaking,9 the speech theory is grounded in our First Amendment values, focusing attention on the political work of undocumented migration. The First Amendment
recognizes that American law makes a weak claim to adherence when those subject
to it lack a voice or vote in its construction. 10 By migrating without permission, the
undocumented protest immigration law’s failure to meet these basic standards of legal legitimacy. This political work is obscured in other accounts; it becomes visible
by analogy to free speech.
First Amendment scholar Robert Post has written that our free-speech tradition
requires “all possible objectives, all possible versions of national identity, be rendered problematic and open to inquiry.”11 By “illegally” migrating, the undocumented articulate a version of national identity where the citizenry does not
control who, with peaceful intentions, may enter and remain present within U.S.
borders. This is an experimental mode of political organization that I call the chooseyourself model.12 The debate between this model and the orthodox we-choose-you

6. See infra Parts I & II. For an argument illustrating the productive quality of illegal
action in property law, see Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1095 (2007) (showing how “property” lawbreakers “have enabled
the reevaluation of, and . . . productive shifts in, the distribution or content of property
entitlements”).
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part I. Heather Gerken has similarly shown how “illegal” actions—like San
Francisco’s issuance of invalid marriage licenses—can enhance First Amendment values. See
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term – Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 42–43 (2010).
11. Facilitating and tolerating “illegal” migration renders the prevailing model of autocratic control of membership norms and laws “problematic and open to inquiry.” See Robert
Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1119 (1993).
12. See infra Part II. Choice is a problematic concept in this and other areas. I conceive
of migration without permission as a choice in a thin sense that acknowledges the structural
factors that push and pull migrants into the United States. These structural factors predominate
in the decision calculus of people who migrate “illegally.” Still, choice has some descriptive
purchase that most theories of “illegal” migration seek to de-emphasize. Though structural
factors press on all noncitizens, only a minority of aliens subject to such conditions choose to
migrate without permission. This minimal level of agentic difference between those who stay
and tolerate poor conditions and those who migrate is what I mean by “choice” in this Article.
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model13 is sparked and sustained by “illegal” migration. Including the voice of aliens
in this debate in this flawed way makes immigration law more legitimate because
doing so gives aliens subject to immigration law a voice in its formulation.14
This does not mean, however, that the choose-yourself model should prevail or
that the deportation power is null.15 “Illegal” migration is speech that contests the
we-choose-you model. The citizenry can then answer this protest with deportation,
tolerance, weaker enforcement, amnesty, or some combination of all of these. We
might pick one or another “answer” precisely because of the persuasive work that
undocumented migrants have done while present without permission. 16 Through this
sub-ideal democratic process, we constitute the border and renegotiate sovereignty
over aliens. Thus far, “illegal” migrants have been persuasive. Despite Donald
Trump’s rise, 65% of Americans currently support a path to citizenship for the undocumented, a number that has increased from 59% in 2007.17
Ultimately, this unorthodox discussion may reveal that the United States needs
some version of the we-choose-you model of membership in order to secure the social cohesion18 required for it to thrive. But the case is not open and shut. Decades of
experience incorporating the undocumented into the American social fabric belie the
necessity of the we-choose-you model. And, more importantly, the citizenry cannot
know the necessity of the we-choose-you model19 on the First Amendment’s own
terms—through robust debate and dialogue—without providing some mechanism
through which aliens can register their views on immigration laws. Under current
conditions, where aliens have no formal voice or vote in immigration law, “illegal”
migration and presence is the sub-ideal way that aliens make their voices heard in
this debate.20 If we ever “open the floodgates” and effectively abolish immigration
law, as Kevin Johnson has advocated,21 it will be in part because of the persuasive
speech of “illegal” migrants.
The speech theory breaks new ground. Classic theories of undocumented migration and amnesty emphasize forgiving or forgetting the immigrant’s transgression
but do not undermine a migrant’s illegality or the state’s right to exclude.22 Newer

13. The notion that the United States had open borders for most of its history and that the
passage of the quota acts in the 1920s was a stark break from that tradition is largely a myth.
Aristide Goldberg has shown that the some combination of federal, local and state government
policies have actively regulated immigration from the colonial period to the present. See
generally ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006).
14. See infra Part I.
15. But see infra notes 72–73 (discussing open borders).
16. See infra Part II.E.
17. See Jeffrey M. Jones, 65% Favor Path to Citizenship for Illegal Immigrants, GALLUP
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184577/favor-path-citizenship-illegal-immigrants.aspx
[https://perma.cc/BZ6G-4QC5].
18. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 92 (2014) (urging that the
we-choose-you model is necessary to secure national social cohesion and internal equality).
19. See infra Part I.D.
20. See infra Part I.D.
21. See generally KEVIN JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009).
22. Legal scholar Linda Bosniak has grouped theories of undocumented migration and
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theories problematize the illegality of undocumented migrants but accept the legitimacy or desirability of the we-choose-you model. Legal scholar Hiroshi Motomura,
for example, argues that the deliberate underenforcement of immigration law for
many decades created an implied contract between “illegal” migrants and the United
States that requires migrants’ legalization. 23 No such obligation would have arisen,
on Motomura’s theory, had the United States robustly enforced immigration law all
along. In this way, Motomura, like many other legal theorists, finds no inherent legal
problem with the we-choose-you model and does not illustrate how undocumented
migrants contest that model and change it.24
The speech theory closes these gaps in our understanding. By showing how undocumented migration can be understood as legitimate protest speech, the speech
theory articulates a legal problem with the we-choose-you model (no alien voice or
vote in immigration law formation) and offers a new way to undermine the illegality
of undocumented migration (“illegal” migrant protestors are not simply lawbreakers).
The speech theory also challenges immigration law scholars to look at “illegal”
migration as a productive force—not just a pathology. This perspective is novel. The
legal scholarship tends to portray “illegal” migration as any other legal problem, as

amnesty into those that “forgive” or “forget.” She opposes these theories to newer “vindicatory” theories which would acknowledge in some way that undocumented migrants were in
the right by migrating. Forgiving and forgetting both seek to wipe the slate clean, reinstantiating border regulation from a position of zero error. They erase the regulatory mistakes of the past by incorporating the current undocumented population into the body politic,
or the legal alien population, and then perfecting immigration regulation for the future so that
an undocumented population does not reemerge. See Linda Bosniak, Amnesty in Immigration:
Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, 16 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 344, 361, 363–64
(2013) (citing and discussing AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND
GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009); MICHAEL M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Hiroshi Motomura, What Is “Comprehensive Immigration
Reform”? Taking the Long View, 63 ARK. L. REV. 225 (2010); Ayelet Shachar, Earned
Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 110 (2011)
[hereinafter Shachar Property Lessons]).
By contrast, a vindicatory theory of “illegal” migration and amnesty would flow from:
(1) the state’s forfeiture of sovereign rights to exclude—through, say, open tolerance of the
undocumented, (2) the fact that the state benefits from a migrant’s toil in the receiving country,
(3) a kind of reparations framework that views liberalized migration as a substitute for cash
compensation for colonialist wrongs, and (4) “the receiving state’s role in producing calamitous political or economic consequences abroad which propelled portions of the sending
state’s population to depart.” Id. at 359–61 (citing the theories of scholars Hiroshi Motomura,
Michael Walzer, and Rogers Smith, and of activist Alex Franco); see also MOTOMURA, supra
note 18 (refining theory of undocumented migration and amnesty as contract) (reviewed in
Stephen Lee, Book Reviews: Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2015));
Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of Americans
in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359 (2012).
The speech theory of “illegal” migration is a vindicatory theory that adds to existing theories by emphasizing the constructive, norm-generating work of “illegal” migration, and by
grounding the right to migrate outside the law in the free-speech flaw in immigration law,
rather than in any action or inaction by the state. See infra Part I.
23. See MOTOMURA, supra note 18 at 106–07.
24. See id.
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something to be solved and eliminated through rational legal reform,25 a symptom of
imperfect regulation that ought to be fixed. 26 But this frame leaves out the persuasive
work of undocumented migration, the way it has forced positive revisions in our
thinking about membership in the United States.27 Absent those who migrate without
permission, scholars and citizens would not have discussed the foundational flaws in
our immigration laws or our conception of sovereignty over aliens. We would never
have invented ways of earning citizenship, 28 formulated tolerance of undocumented
migration as an implied contract,29 or thought hard about how our immigration laws
constrict the life chances of millions of people outside our borders.30 Nor would the
Supreme Court have extended equal protection rights to undocumented children. 31
Undocumented migrants have forced the global implications of our national immigration policies onto the legal and political agenda. The speech theory accounts for
this constructive work and contemplates the normative development that we would
lose in an immigration system that remained restrictively governed by citizens, but
with perfect enforcement and due process—a system that erases the “illegal” migrant.
This point about erasure is more important than ever. As Donald Trump taps latent

25. For a general argument against the tendency of legal scholarship to offer solutions
rather than a thorough understanding of the context of any given legal problem, see Paul W.
Kahn, Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 141 (2001).
26. David Martin’s work is emblematic of the broader scholarly faith in the perfectibility
of immigration law administration. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration
Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525 (2007). Recent experience with comprehensive immigration reform undermines the notion, expressed by Martin and others, that better
enforcement will lead to an expanded visa supply and more total immigration. The 2013 bill
that came closest to cashing out the traditional immigration reform model—with more lowwage visas, more border enforcement, and amnesty for those undocumented already present
—was projected to lower total future immigration (legal and “illegal”) when compared to the
status quo. See Matthew Yglesias, Obama Is Finally Making the Case for Immigration, Not
Just “Immigration Reform,” VOX (Nov. 21, 2014 11:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/11
/21/7257643/case-for-immigration [https://web.archive.org/web/20160423013951/http://www
.vox.com/2014/11/21/7257643/case-for-immigration] (citing RELEASE: CAP Releases
Current and Estimated Future Immigration Numbers Based on S. 744, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (May 2, 2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release/2013/05/02/61935
/release-cap-releases-current-and-estimated-future-immigration-numbers-based-on-s-744/ [https://
perma.cc/D6AQ-3GLL]).
27. See MOTOMURA, supra note 18, at 172–208 (discussing legalization of “illegal” migrants and the addition of a guest worker program as long-term solutions to undocumented
migration). But see Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of
Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2007) (arguing that “illegal” migration coupled with deportation of those convicted of crimes is a more efficient system for facilitating
migration of low-skill workers than a visa system that selects persons ex ante); cf. Judith
Resnik, Bordering by Law: The Migration of Law, Crimes, Sovereignty, and the Mail, in
NOMOS: IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION (Jack Knight ed., 2015) (urging that global agreements to facilitate free movement of mail offers a cooperative international model for decriminalizing migration and facilitating free movement of persons).
28. See Shachar Property Lessons, supra note 22, at 121–22.
29. See MOTOMURA, supra note 18, at 105–12.
30. See infra Part I.B.
31. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 209 (1982).
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anti-immigrant animus, it is easy to think that citizens and aliens would all be better
off if “illegal” migration would simply disappear. And perhaps the citizenry, and its
chosen few noncitizens, would be better off if “illegal” migration were eradicated.
But perfect administration would surely deny many millions of people access to the
transformative power of life in the United States. The citizenry’s monopoly on immigration control means that legal visas are likely to remain under-supplied relative
to demand from aliens. The last Senate-passed comprehensive immigration reform
bill illustrates this problem: it would have significantly lowered total immigration to
the U.S.—legal plus “illegal”—because its stepped-up enforcement measures would
have reduced “illegal” migration by far more than the visa supply expanded.32 Under
these political conditions preserving a space for “illegal” migration is essential for
those who think the material welfare and horizon of opportunity of all human beings
are of equal moral concern.
For citizens and citizen scholars, the speech theory acknowledges the validity of
their doubts about the feasibility or desirability of open borders while pushing them
to grapple with the fundamental injustice of making laws that apply to aliens without
their input. It encourages citizens not to “forgive and forget”33 undocumented
migrants’ trespass of U.S. borders, but to question our power to make those laws for
aliens and aliens’ duty to obey them; to see that aliens might have the right to trespass
our immigration laws because such laws significantly narrow their life chances and
were made without their input.
The speech theory also helps citizens see what they gain from the speech of the
undocumented: the opportunity to witness how our political community can successfully accommodate people who we did not expressly want or ask for, and how our
understanding of sovereign power over aliens can evolve to embrace those who
breached that power. We would not be able to assimilate concrete evidence of our
social, legal, and political adaptability if aliens had not violated our immigration laws
and asked to become members nonetheless. Embracing this kind of evolution
—giving a voice to aliens—can help to place the United States at the vanguard of
democratic politics.
For aliens, the speech theory offers agency, moral authority, and recognition of
their contribution to American democratic legal development. The broken families,
the stress of living in the shadows, and the risk of death in crossing a border—all of
that suffering was not just an effort to enhance the material welfare of migrants’
families; it was also to protest the injustice and arbitrariness of how birthplace fixes
one’s life chances. The undocumented chose themselves to join the American community rather than allow the happenstance of birthplace to shape their destinies and
those of their children forever. They were not just pushed and pulled by economic
and geopolitical forces out of their control; they were not just exploited by employers
who want their labor with no strings attached. The undocumented also have fought
these forces in an effort to take control of their own futures. For that they deserve
credit. The speech theory, unlike others, acknowledges and celebrates these facts.
I develop the argument in three parts. In Part I, I describe what I call the freespeech flaw in immigration law: the exceptional fact that immigration law is made

32. See Yglesias, supra note 26.
33. See Bosniak, supra note 22, at 347–48.
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by citizens to apply solely to aliens. Using First Amendment theory and the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas, I argue that “illegal” migration as practiced in the United
States is a form of sub-ideal political speech. In Part II, I show how “illegal” migration is speech in a way that is similar to how actions of the civil, gay, and women’s
rights movements were speech. Specifically, I show how the subordination of those
groups of citizens required initial illegal actions in order ultimately to conduct a political dialogue that sounds more like the traditional core of protected First Amendment political speech. Because the Supreme Court vindicated some such actions as
speech, I argue that the act of “illegally” migrating can be similarly conceptualized.
In Part III, I analyze President Obama’s recent executive actions and suggest that
they show that “illegal” migration has persuasive power. Both the fact that Obama
took significant political and legal34 risk35 for a controversial group of nonvoters, and
that many of those actions make it easier to live as an undocumented person, show
that “illegal” migration has a persuasive force similar to traditional forms of rational
argument.
Theories are critical to legal and social change because they light the way forward.
I offer my speech theory of “illegal” migration as a supplement to other accounts. I
hope that the speech theory, even if in error, sparks new discussions and ways of
thinking that help to move immigration law in the direction of justice.
I. THE FREE-SPEECH FLAW IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Immigration law is exceptional in so many ways, 36 and here is another one: aliens
lack a formal voice or vote in immigration law, even though such laws apply only to

34. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (enjoining the
Department of Homeland Security from granting a temporary reprieve from deportation to
millions of undocumented migrants), aff’d 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016). Though an equally divided Supreme Court left in place an injunction staying Obama’s
executive relief for some undocumented, the defined enforcement criteria discussed in Part
II.D, infra, will stand, as they went unchallenged. Id. Moreover, my claim that undocumented
migration has had persuasive force still holds. This ruling, which forecloses expanded deferred
action, is a blow to migrants, but it will not silence them; instead the decision will move the
conversation onto a different institutional stage. States and localities, for instance, now appear
ready to lead the fight to protect the undocumented.
35. See infra Part III. See generally President Obama’s Unilateral Action on Immigration
Has No Precedent, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/president-obamas-unilateral-action-on-immigration-has-no-precedent/2014/12/03/3fd78650-79a3
-11e4-9a27-6fdbc612bff8_story.html [https://perma.cc/J9X8-H6QU].
36. Where immigration law is concerned, “the normal rules of constitutional law simply
do not apply.” STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 113 (5th ed. 2009). The modern federal immigration power is constitutionally exceptional in two distinct but interrelated aspects. First, the authority to regulate
immigration derives not from any enumerated power, but it is rather “an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States.” Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). “Second, the federal government’s adoption and enforcement of
immigration laws is buffered against judicially enforceable constitutional constraints.”
Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 68 FLA. L. REV. 178, 187 (2016).
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them and not to the citizens who pass them. 37 Yet, law in a democracy earns our
fidelity by our having had a voice and vote—a free-speech say—in its articulation.38
Under these conditions of formal exclusion from our borders and from the debate
about our borders, “illegal” migration becomes the only means by which aliens can
gain an effective voice, if not a vote, in the formation of immigration law. “Illegal”
migration forces the democratic community to debate the boundary of that community in a more robust, more inclusive way—in a way that begins to approximate the
way that it debates any other law.39 This sort of contestation cannot adequately occur
where only citizens speak in the immigration debate to other citizens: aliens must
speak for themselves too.40

The Congressional powers to exclude and to deport aliens have been held to be
‘plenary’. . . . ‘Over no conceivable subject,’ the Supreme Court has repeatedly
said, ‘is the legislative power of Congress more complete.’ When regulating immigration, Congress may discriminate on the basis of race. It may discriminate
on the bases of gender and legitimacy. It may restrict aliens’ political speech
without having to establish a clear and present danger. With some qualifications,
Congress may disregard procedural due process when excluding aliens.
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 178 (1987); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary
Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 926 (1995).
The discretion that the executive branch and the immigration agency may exercise over aliens
and in the enforcement of immigration has also been exceptional. See generally Adam B. Cox
& Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009);
Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 961 (1998).
37. See Arash Abizadeh, Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right To
Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders, 36 POL. THEORY 37, 41 (2008). Abizadeh argues that
the border control laws of existing democratic societies, including immigration laws, are illegitimate because they are not democratically constituted by the aliens subject to them. Immigration law could legitimately bind aliens if, under stringent conditions of democratic participation, aliens democratically authorize the borders they are subject to. Absent this democratic
consent, the democratic state acts illegitimately when it enforces sovereignty against aliens
who have not democratically consented to it. Abizadeh’s is an ideal theory; a pantomime of
alien approval will not do. For borders to be democratically legitimate, all persons subject to
the border regime “must have the opportunity . . . actually to participate in the political processes that determine how power is exercised, on terms that . . . are consistent with their freedom and equality.” Id.
38. See infra Part I.A.
39. “[T]here is ‘practically universal agreement’” that one “core norm” of the First
Amendment “is democracy.” James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value
of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497 n.37, 498 (2011) (“[T]here is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.”) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
40. It is difficult for oppressed people to speak to power and be heard through asymmetric
power relations, as a number of theoretical literatures relate. Feminist legal theorist Catherine
MacKinnon famously argued that pornography silences women in a way that violates free
speech. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
193 (1987); see also Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
293, 294–98 (1993) (using J.L. Austin’s speech act theory to describe how the subordinated
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Aliens speak when they migrate in violation of the law 41 and then advocate for
their legal inclusion nonetheless. By speaking the illegitimacy of their unconsented
exclusion from our borders, the undocumented provide citizens with the opportunity
to discuss and overcome one of the last remaining tensions in our democracy: the
regulation of membership in democratic government by undemocratic means.42
Ironically, then, the protest speech of “illegal” migration, and the United States’ relative tolerance for it,43 make immigration law more legitimate by—quite imperfectly—filling in this gap in voice.

can be silenced by structural conditions—including pornography—which prevent the empowered listener from comprehending the subordinated speaker’s intended meaning). The
postcolonial literature and legal scholarship building on it, offer similar accounts focused on
the silencing that occurs in the postcolonial relationship, where overlapping power differentials (empire, race, gender) radically constrict the means of communication for subjugated
persons. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1411 (2003) (citing
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271, 296–97 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988) (asking
whether the subordinated can effectively communicate in the face of multiple layers of
distorting power)); see generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979). Still, the oppressed
do manage to find ways to be heard, and some legal scholars and political scientists have
focused on documenting the strategies that enable subordinated groups to speak through power
and resist it. See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF
PEASANT RESISTANCE 29–31 (1985) (theorizing strategies like “foot dragging, dissimulation,
false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, [and] sabotage” as “weapons of
the weak”: the means by which oppressed people resist power, as well as cultivate and
maintain an oppositional consciousness.); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom,
106 YALE L.J. 941, 953 (1997) (“Disruptive noncompliance is the quintessential form of
subordinated group power. Lacking the informational, organizational, and financial resources
to compete with elites in the representative political process, subordinate groups exercise
direct power by withholding cooperation from existing institutions.”); see also PAULO FREIRE,
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos, trans., 1970) (emphasizing the agency
of subordinated groups to contest power structures); JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE
ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (1990).
41. See infra Part I.A–I.B and Part II for discussion of how the act of migrating without
permission can be conceptualized as speech. See also JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A
POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 24–25, 43–44 (1997) (describing J.L. Austin’s Speech Act
theory, which describes and taxonomizes the communicative content of actions).
42. As the first nation-state to adopt a theory and practice of sovereignty grounded in the
anarchic, collective of “the People,” the United States has unique cultural and legal resources
with which to ask the question of who ought to decide who the People should be. America, as
our revolutionary history and the discussion infra Parts II and III show, is fertile ground for
the contestation of sovereignty norms. Our national interest in embracing rather than resisting
that fertility is political evolution. See Daniel I. Morales, Undocumented Migrants as New
(and Peaceful) American Revolutionaries, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 135 (2016)
(describing the radical social strains that motivated American revolutionaries and analogizing
them to the circumstances and position of the undocumented).
43. For discussion of tolerance of undocumented migration see MOTOMURA, supra note
18, at 86–112.
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A. Legal Legitimacy and Free Speech
Free speech and democracy go hand-in-hand; their bond is so strong that we think
a democracy without free speech scarcely a democracy at all. In the United States
“[t]he free speech clause of the First Amendment has become the ground-norm of
the entire constitutional edifice. So much so that there are arguments that it is beyond
the possibility of amendment.”44 Put another way, the operation of free speech is a
de facto predicate to legal legitimacy in our constitutional system. A law adopted in
the absence of free speech would have a lesser claim to our adherence—or perhaps
none at all—even where it was otherwise passed following constitutional procedures
(bicameralism, presentment, etc.).45
This domestic tie between legal legitimacy and free speech strongly resonates
with the legal theory of Jürgen Habermas. For Habermas, law is legitimate where it
is the product of the “unforced force of the better argument.” 46 The ideal aspiration
of his theory is to have democratic deliberation—a very strong, egalitarian form of
free political speech47—produce binding law, so that coercion is grounded in reasons

44. See PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 150 (2011) (citation omitted).
45. The claim is not that immigration law is not law in the positivist sense because it lacks
democratic authorization. See SCOTT J. SCHAPIRO, LEGALITY 1–35 (2011) (discussing the definition of legal positivism). Rather, my claim is that immigration law makes a weaker claim to
obedience—it is less legitimate—than other categories of United States law because it is in
serious tension with free-speech norms. I base this claim in part on a sociological observation
that most American citizens would agree that laws passed in liberal democratic societies with
robust free-speech rights have stronger claims to legitimacy than laws passed where those
rights did not obtain. See KAHN, supra note 44, at 148. These same citizens make an exception
for immigration law. Aliens are expected to obey immigration laws despite their being denied
a free-speech say in their formation. Following Abizadeh, this exception is indefensible for a
democracy. See Abizadeh, supra note 37. It is particularly indefensible in the United States
context given the revolutionary history of our democracy and the special place of immigration
in the socio-historical fabric. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
46. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 306 (Williams Rehg trans., MIT Press, 1998) (1992)
[hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]. This ideal formulation of the procedural predicate
to legitimate democratic law has influenced legal scholars in a variety of ways. See Oren
Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability
in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1171 (2008) (using Habermas’s ideal to bolster claim that search engine manipulation is wrong); A. Michael Froomkin,
Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749,
752 (2003) (arguing that the rulemaking procedures of the Internet Engineering Task Force
meet “Habermas’s notoriously demanding procedural conditions for a discourse capable of
legitimating its outcomes”); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of
Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 686 n.6 (1992) (using Habermas to unpack legal scholars’
use of “communitarian values”); Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political
Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 647 (2008) (describing the
applicability of Habermas’s ideal conditions for free speech to campaign finance law).
47. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE
ETHICS 163–64 (Ciaran Cronin trans., MIT Press, 1993) (1991) (specifying that the set of
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that all affected persons could accept. The result is law that we respect because it has
been rationally formulated with our input and in our interest, not because the sword
of Damocles hangs over us or our basic economic security48 depends on our adherence to law’s commands.49
Habermas’s theory of legal legitimacy was applied systematically to First Amendment doctrine by American legal theorist Lawrence Solum. 50 Solum claimed that the
speech-legitimacy tie fits critical aspects of First Amendment doctrine and “provides
a coherent justification for the freedom of speech,”51 indeed, a more coherent justification and a better fit than other possibilities. 52 Advocacy of violent revolution, to
take one important example, is permissible under the First Amendment per Solum
because the government’s claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of violent force
must itself be justified through open dialogue with the people subject to it. The only
way to challenge this monopoly on violence is through “implicit justification or explicit advocacy of illegal action, either of nonviolent civil disobedience or of violent
revolution.”53 “Such fundamental challenges must be allowed” in order to maintain
that our government’s monopoly on violence is legitimate. 54 “If government does not
allow discourse which challenges its legitimacy [in this way] . . . [s]ocial consensus
on government legitimacy might be maintained through force,” but that force would
remain illegitimate for repressing speech with the sword. 55 In this way, the right to
robust—even radical—dissent that could produce actual violence fortifies law’s
claim to our fidelity.
The legitimating work of speech might seem superficial from this telling; if we
let people say what they want, then laws are legitimate. In fact, Habermas has advanced stringent criteria that attend an “ideal speech situation” 56 where law is most
fully legitimate. These criteria include the substantive, social, and legal equality of
discussants and deliberative democratic procedures designed to ensure that all perspectives are heard.57 These background assumptions ensure that the “unforced force
of the better argument” actually prevails in law, rather than unspoken power
differentials.

procedural conditions for the formation of perfectly legitimate law set in the “ideal speech
situation” is aspirational).
48. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 46, at 122–24 (discussing how the
guarantee of basic social welfare to participants may be required for debates to produce
legitimate agreements); id. at 103, 266 (discussing the all-affected principle).
49. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 761–64 (discussing “Hobbesian predators” as an
oppositional threat to ideal Habermasian debate).
50. See Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 119–22 (1989).
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id. at 68–85.
53. Id. at 122.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 96–99 (discussing the procedural characteristics of the ideal speech situation).
57. For society to come to collective agreements that are legitimate, persons subject to the
decision must be granted certain “basic rights that citizens must mutually grant one another if
they want to legitimately regulate their life in common . . . .” BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,
supra note 46, at 118.
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Of course, we are never in the “ideal speech situation.” 58 As with aspirational
constitutional norms, we are always working from below looking up. From this vantage point, the tie between speech and suffrage elaborated by canonical First Amendment theorist Alexander Meiklejohn is quite useful. Free speech, politics, and legitimate lawmaking are intertwined for Meiklejohn because “public issues shall be
decided by universal suffrage.”59 Speech has persuasive force—the “unforced force
of the better argument”—in the context of its relationship to the ballot.60 The New
England town hall meeting is Meiklejohn’s “ideal speech situation”; in it, robust,
decorous discussion combines with the vote to form legitimate law. 61
But, writing in 1948, Meiklejohn recognized the dramatic extent to which his
town-hall ideal did not obtain. He called that pre-civil-rights-movement reality “alien
government” and described it as follows:
Governments, we insist, derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed. If that consent be lacking, governments have no just
powers. . . . [T]o an unforgivable degree, citizens of the United States are
still subjected to decisions in the making of which they have had no effective share. So far as this is true, we are not self-governed; we are not
politically free. We are governed by others. And perhaps worse, we are,
without their consent, the governors of others. . . . Alien government . . .
[is w]hen one man or some self-chosen group holds control, without consent, over others, the relation between them is one of force and counterforce, of compulsion on the one hand and submission or resistance on the
other.62
At the time, and still today,63 African Americans and other marginalized groups were
subject to “alien government.”

58. Between Facts and Norms and The Theory of Communicative Action have relaxed the
procedural and substantive criteria to form legitimate law. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at
767–68.
59. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27
(1948).
60. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 46, at 306. Free speech and politics are intertwined, flowing from the basic democratic principle that “public issues shall be decided by
universal suffrage;” speech has force precisely because of that relationship. MEIKLEJOHN,
supra note 59, at 27. The reverse holds true too: the free speech of aliens is less efficacious for
having no direct relationship to electoral power.
61. See HABERMAS, supra note 47, at 163–64. Of course, these are not Meiklejohn’s
terms, but they fit key aspects of his theory of the First Amendment. I draw connections between Habermas, Solum, and Meiklejohn in an effort to strengthen the tie between free speech
and legitimate lawmaking for an audience of lawyers. Illustrating how domestic free-speech
thinkers dovetail with Habermas’s universal theory, I aim to particularize some of Habermas’s
claims to the American context.
62. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 59, at 3–5 (emphasis added).
63. The numerous incidents of violence against African Americans at the hands of the
state, most recently publicized by the #BlackLivesMatter movement, are among the most
prominent ways in which African Americans are denied their “effective share” in selfgovernance. See BLACK LIVES MATTER, blacklivesmatter.com [https://perma.cc/MRA6-PVZ6];
see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
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To be sure, even then, such groups had a token or symbolic “share” in governance:
in 1948 some African Americans did stand and speak on the soapbox and, to an even
more limited degree, at the ballot box. But their share in self-governance was not
“effective.” Government was “alien” to African Americans because, though citizens
properly entitled to full rights of self-governance, they stood in the position of
aliens—political outsiders ruled by force and compulsion—when they were denied
their “effective share” in self-governance.
If free speech is the New England town hall meeting, African Americans and other
subordinated citizens living under alien government are unheard because they are
kept out of the hall; they are denied voice and the vote, just like the aliens immigration law excludes from the political community.
B. Immigration Law as Alien Government, or Rule sans Voice and Vote
What of the alien who wishes to migrate but is excluded? He is always living
under alien government, yet we barely notice. How can we maintain that aliens must
respect laws in which they have had no “effective share”?
Immigration law is made in opposition to the town hall or the “ideal speech situation.” It is made, self-consciously, “in the shadow of force.”64 Constitutional immigration and citizenship law is profoundly comfortable with granting Congress—and
to a lesser extent, the executive—unfettered power to admit and deport aliens on
whatever substantive grounds they wish65 and absent the suffrage and free speech
predicates that legitimate other laws.66 Yet the Constitution does not mandate this
exceptional authority. The constitutional plenary authority doctrine, and all of the
immigration law doctrines made in its shadow, were found by the Supreme Court to
be implied in a nineteenth-century theory of sovereignty. 67 That theory was

COLORBLINDNESS (2010); Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of
Minority Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 57–69 (2014). The historical and ongoing
economic violence done to black communities strongly suggests that the United States lacks
the conditions of substantive equality required for just lawmaking under a Habermasian theory
of legitimacy. See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Coats, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations/361631/
[https://perma.cc/LRE9-AGD8] (describing the systemic and continuing destruction of black
wealth by the United States government).
64. KAHN, supra note 44, at 136.
65. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
66. We formulate immigration law without any formal voice for those it applies to. Aliens
do not vote in our elections, even if they live with our permission within our borders. And
aliens not present within our borders, but who wish to migrate yet are excluded, are also denied
a voice in the formulation of the rules that govern who may enter or be excluded from the
United States. See generally Abizadeh, supra note 37.
67. “[T]he authority to regulate immigration does not derive from any enumerated power,
but is rather ‘an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States.’”
Lindsay, supra note 36, at 187 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609
(1889)). T. Alexander Aleinikoff and David Martin have argued that:
(a) The overall constitutional structure reveals an intent to place the federal
government of the United States on an equal footing with the central governments of other nations, and the latter have the power to exclude noncitizens; and
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grounded, in turn, in monarchical, pre-democratic thought.68
Yet this exceptional state is utterly natural to us. To understand just how natural,
consider that American political philosopher John Rawls validated the status quo on
immigration exclusion69 even though he used the arbitrariness of one’s material circumstances at birth as the pivot point for his entire egalitarian political theory. 70 Is
not the accident of citizenship as arbitrary a material endowment as being born a
Rockefeller71—a problem for social justice that Rawls did take seriously? Indeed,

(b) The framers must have intended to authorize the federal government to define
who we are as a people.
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 36, at 125 (citing T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID
A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS & POLICY 16–18 (1st ed. 1985)).
Michael Scaperlanda has shown the historical contingency of the theory of sovereignty that
plenary authority continues to nourish to this day:
Plenary power developed in this era of “absolute” sovereignty, when no global
legal infrastructure existed to harness the power of an individual nation-state
within its own domain. Additionally, although the international legal framework
ordered relations among independent sovereigns, it lacked concern for the status
of individual human beings. Persons were objects, not subjects, in the international arena; they lacked rights and duties. This picture informed the Court’s view
of the constitutional rights of noncitizens, and it still informs the Court’s view
today. This snapshot is but a single frame in a much larger international drama
that continues to unfold. The Court’s plenary power cases, however, continue to
cling to the faded still photography of last century, failing to acknowledge sovereignty’s motion, including drastic changes in international human rights law in
our century.
Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 970–71
(1993) (emphasis omitted).
68. Allison Brownell Tirres notes how the plenary authority doctrine is “cast as premodern, a throwback to sovereignty in a time of monarchy, not democracy, when constitutions
could not, or did not, fully control sovereign prerogative.” Allison Brownell Tirres, Mercy in
Immigration Law, 2013 BYU. L. REV. 1563, 1602 (2013). Criminal law theorist Markus
Dubber has noted a similar tension in the American criminal law, arguing that the United
States has retained a monarchical criminal law that has not been reconstituted in light of democratic political theory. See Markus D. Dubber, The State as Victim: Treason and the Paradox
of American Criminal Law 5, 7–8 (Dec. 21, 2009) (unpublished manuscript).
69. Rawls defines the “liberal peoples” that make societies behind the veil of ignorance
as those who share a hereditary lineage. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 23 (2d ed.
1999) [hereinafter THE LAW OF PEOPLES].
70. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999); Leif Wenar, John
Rawls: Two Guiding Ideas of Justice as Fairness, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sept. 24,
2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#TwoGuiIdeJusFai [https://perma.cc/SJR3-BVBN].
71. The income of the average migrant increases an average of 125%, or about $10,798,
by moving to the more productive nations of the developed world. See John Kennan, Open
Borders, 16 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS L1, L11 (2013) (all estimates are in 2012 dollars and adjusted for purchasing power); see also LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME: BREAKING
THE GRIDLOCK ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOBILITY 33 (2006).
The wealthy nations not only offer migrants more hard cash, but a litany of institutions and
other collective investments—education, health care, clean water, plumbing—that materially
increase well-being, but are not captured in migrants’ paychecks. If, following Rawls, what
we really care about is potential for self-actualization, then among nearly all indicia that human
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before Rawls took this position on immigration law, Joseph Carens, in perhaps the
most cited article ever written on citizenship and nationality, extrapolated from
Rawls’s premises in his early work that “the right to migrate” was as essential to
Rawls’s theory as any other right owed to all persons in a just Rawlsian state. 72
Rawls’s ultimate, relatively uncritical73 refusal74 to include liberalized immigration in his theory of the just state reflects the profound degree to which exclusive
control of entry and exit by sovereigns—democratic or not—has been naturalized.75
Nearly every reader will share Rawls’s intuition that nations need exclusive control
over entry and exit of persons, and that laws which effect this power are exempt from
the normal legitimacy predicates operative in a democratic state. We think alien government is just fine—for aliens.
C. Legitimating Alien Government with “Illegal” Migration
Just because alien government for aliens standing at the border is natural, does
not mean it is right.76 Solum saw part of the constitutional problem with requiring

beings care about, migration extends the horizon of possibility for migrants in dramatic fashion. See Wenar, supra note 70.
72. Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251,
258 (1987).
73. Political theorist Jacqueline Stevens criticized Rawls for adopting without analysis
John Stuart Mill’s view that to “exist as a political community, people need to have the ‘common sympathies’ found in ‘race and descent.’ Only political societies formed on this basis,
Rawls infers from Mill, share the requisite ‘community of recollections; collective pride and
humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.’” JACQUELINE
STEVENS, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS: CITIZENSHIP FOR MORTALS 33–34 (2010) (citation omitted) [hereinafter STATES WITHOUT NATIONS].
74. See THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 69; text accompanying note 69.
75. Stevens criticizes other political theorists and philosophers—Rawls, Walzer, and Raz,
among others—for failing to see and explore the incompatibility of “ancestral paradigms of
membership” with liberalism. See STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73, at 31–37.
76. The theory of “illegal” migration as speech shares important characteristics of a “critical theory,” a mode of scholarly argument associated most prominently with the Frankfurt
School, and that has gained traction in the legal academy via the related critical legal studies
and critical race theory movements. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING
EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 3d ed. 2013) (collecting canonical and
contemporary contributions to Critical Race Theory); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE (David Kairys, ed., 3d. ed. 1998) (collecting seminal writings of the critical legal
studies movement); James Bohman, Critical Theory, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 8,
2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/critical-theory/ [https://perma.cc/9AVKJVD6] (“[A] critical theory provides the descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry
aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms.”).
My central claim that “illegal” migration is speech—and moreover, a kind of speech that
makes immigration law more legitimate than it would otherwise be—is an example of a form
of Frankfurt School social criticism called “ideology critique.” Ideology critique “help[s] reveal contradictions and injustice in the reigning ideologies and worldviews of liberal democracies, notably the problems of economic, legal, and ideological domination.” Froomkin,
supra note 46, at 768 (citing JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 36–37, 142–43
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975)). My claims also follow in critical theory’s tradition of
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aliens to follow laws without a voice or vote, arguing that aliens “within the physical
confines of a political community” must be granted a robust form of freedom of
speech that impliedly includes voting rights, 77 since “[n]o decision concerning
noncitizens can be fully rational [a criterion of legal legitimacy for Habermas] if the
decision is made on the basis of an agreement that was reached only because
noncitizens were not given the right to participate in discourses which affect them.”78
There is no good reason why Solum’s concern should not extend to aliens not
present within our borders, at least with respect to immigration laws, since they are
affected negatively by the exclusion those laws enforce.79 The negative effects of
immigration law on aliens are robustly documented. Immigration law is a problem
for democratic law and free speech, because immigration law demands the obedience
of aliens without a voice or vote.80 It is a problem from a materialist perspective
because it causes substantial and avoidable material suffering among billions of

consciousness-raising. See Bohman, supra (“[A] theory is critical to the extent that it seeks
human ‘emancipation from slavery’, acts as a ‘liberating [. . .] influence’, and works “to create
a world which satisfies the needs and powers” of human beings.”). The speech theory of “illegal” migration aims to showcase to legal scholars the constructive qualities of “illegal” migration in an effort to help scholars see the political potential and political work of undocumented migration more clearly, and, in turn, to help steer legal reform towards the preservation of those constructive elements of undocumented migration and away from the legal
practices that silence migrants’ speech. Eventually, perhaps, some version of this theory might
be adopted, appropriated, or critiqued by the undocumented themselves, or those who—with
the permission of the undocumented—represent their interests.
77. Solum says only that aliens must be granted the “freedom of communicative action.”
Solum, supra note 50, at 111 n.210. But “communicative action,” Habermas’s term, would
seem to require voting rights in the sub-ideal institutional settings where Solum means his
theory of the First Amendment to apply. This point has been clarified in Habermas’s later
work. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 774 (“It would be perfectly consistent with
[Habermasian] discourse ethics . . . for a group to agree that it will decide disputed questions
by majority vote, given the need to make decisions in real time, so long as the ‘decision[s]’”
conform to other key procedural criteria, like being “rationally motivated.” (quoting BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 46, at 449–50)).
78. Solum, supra note 50, at 111 n.210.
79. First Amendment Scholar Timothy Zick has thoroughly considered the place of
aliens’ interests in the First Amendment scheme. The First Amendment, Zick urges, ought to
protect, among other things, “the right to associate with aliens at home and abroad” and “foreign visitors” should not be excluded on the basis of speech or association. See generally
TIMOTHY ZICK, THE COSMOPOLITAN FIRST AMENDMENT: PROTECTING TRANSBORDER
EXPRESSIVE LIBERTIES (2014). But Zick’s normative concerns have more to do with ensuring
Americans’ access to global, informational, and associational interchange than the formation
of law that is just from a global point of view. Accordingly, Zick’s theory would appear to
accept that aliens have a right to say something about our immigration policy, but would seem
to reject the idea that migrating “illegally” has speech content of concern to the First
Amendment or that we should embrace the way such actions facilitate a conversation about
the power to exclude. His theory would, I venture, imagine aliens’ contestation of autocratic
immigration law as a process that should happen in the university seminar room, rather than
the big tent of political protest movements.
80. See Abizadeh, supra note 37; supra Parts I.B & I.C.
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humans.81 It is a problem for liberalism because restrictions on free movement of

81. Economists’ best (though necessarily quite speculative) estimates of the global economic gains that would accrue in a world of free migration hover around one hundred percent
of global GDP. That is, global GDP would double if people could move where they wanted
to, an increase of 77.6 trillion dollars. See LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME:
BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOBILITY 33 (2006). In 2004 U.S. dollars, see Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Current Prices From 2004 to 2014,
STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/268750/global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/ [https://
perma.cc/3E9F-X7YD]. A modest five percent increase in the labor force of developed
countries would increase global GDP by 571 billion dollars by 2025, an amount twice that of
Norway’s 2013 annual GDP. See DOMINIQUE VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE & DAVID ROLANDHOLST, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, Global Economic Prospects for
Increasing Developing Country Migration into Developed Countries 23 (2009) (The number
is in 2006 U.S. dollars corrected for purchasing power.); see also Norway, CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html [https://
perma.cc/ZB6Y-8MCY] (2013 dollars PPP) (last updated Sept. 7, 2016). While the new
migrants allowed into rich countries would gain the most from the change, 299 billion dollars,
the natives who sign off on an increase in migration stand to gain much as well, 190 billion
dollars. Even more would be gained if migration to rich countries rose by eight percent. That
scenario would yield a global increase of 874 billion dollars, 297 million for natives of rich
countries and 577 billion dollars for migrants and their home countries. See van der
Mensbrugghe & Roland-Holst, supra at 24–25. And the benefits to the rich countries are still
greater than these huge numbers imply, since migrants generate taxable income in the rich
countries that can be used for public investments that increase welfare directly, or by goosing
the economy to make public investments that allow it to grow more quickly and robustly. With
eight percent growth in migrants to the rich world, the tax base of rich countries would grow
by 734 billion dollars. That these enormous economic gains can be left unrealized is a sign of
just how rich the rich countries are. Though an eight percent increase in migration to the rich
world would result in a significant global increase in GDP, and a radical change in wealth for
migrants themselves, the United States would capture $145 billion of that growth or just .65%
of projected U.S. GDP in 2019. See United States: Gross Domestic Product Based on
Purchasing-Power-Parity Share of World Total, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org
/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=34&pr.y=2&sy=2012&ey=2013
&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=111&s=PPPSH&grp=0&a= [https://perma.cc
/JM2N-8GQ4] (In PPP terms, the United States represents about 16.6% of global GDP); World
Economic Outlook Database: October 2014, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org
/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=18&pr.y=12&sy=2014&ey=2019
&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=156%2C158%2C132%2C112%2C134%2C
111%2C136&s=PPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CPPPSH&grp=0&a= [https://perma.cc/JEF7-G9F4]
(Projected U.S. GDP 2019). The gains are substantial for the developing world because
migrants remit a portion of their wages to family members who remain in sending states. In
2012, the World Bank estimated that American migrants alone sent 123 billion dollars abroad
in remittances, an amount that exceeds the entire GDP of the Dominican Republic by 23 billion
dollars, and is 10 billion dollars shy of New Zealand’s. See Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2012,
THE WORLD BANK, http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDEC
PROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22803131~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK
:476883,00.html [https://perma.cc/UT38-FX8Y] (This value is nominal and taken from the
World Bank’s dataset.). In a number of developing nations, remittances amount to a substantial
proportion of GDP. Twenty-nine percent of Nepal’s GDP consists of cash remittances and a
number of American neighbors post numbers at or above ten percent of GDP, including
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persons are unjustifiably illiberal.82 It is a problem for the just allocation of the
Earth’s resources because many persons’ basic needs are not met in the places they
are born.83
D. Showing Epistemic Modesty About the Immigration Power by Preserving Space
for “Illegal” Migration
It may be that we can ultimately justify the harms that citizen-made immigration
law causes, or arrive at reforms—short of open borders—that meet aliens’ objections
to the current regime. But given the scope of the harms that unilateral control of
borders cause, we owe aliens a justification for the regime more robust than the current backstops: tradition,84 fear of the unknown, and might makes right. 85 And we
cannot formulate a more robust justification unless the power to control borders is
breeched by aliens and we, with their input, assess the ramifications of this forced
suspension of full control over our human composition. 86 “Legal” immigrants cannot

Honduras (16.9%), El Salvador (16.4%), Jamaica (15%), and Guatemala (10%). See the World
Bank Statistics on remittances as a percent of Nominal GDP for 2010-14, Personal
Remittances, Received (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS [https://perma.cc/TW3D-2LWT].
82. See generally STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73.
83. Political philosopher Matthias Risse argues that because all humans in the state of
nature owned the earth as a collective, every person owns a share in the earth’s resources, and
the state system as a whole has an obligation to permit all humans to cash out these shares. If
a person is not a legal resident of a state where her basic needs are met, then she is not being
granted her just entitlement to her share in the original ownership of the earth. Since the share
entails a property right, the migrant in such a position, unlucky by dint of birth, may migrate
to a parcel of the earth where her basic needs can be met. MATHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUSTICE
89–151 (2012).
84. Relying on Rawls, Walzer, and other defenders of bounded democratic states, Hiroshi
Motomura justifies his embrace of bounded democratic communities for the way they maintain “civic solidarity.” MOTOMURA, supra note 18, at 92. The civic solidarity argument is a
version of defending the immigration power status quo based on tradition. This is so because
the evidence for the importance of civic solidarity relies on past practice. Exclusive citizen
control over borders has coincided with democratic citizens trusting each other over time, so
it may be a necessary predicate for civic solidarity to obtain. Jacqueline Stevens has rebutted
the solidarity argument by pointing out the ways that solidarity maintenance is compatible
with the choose-yourself model. See STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73, at 136–52.
Moreover, in defending “civic solidarity” as a justification for the we-choose-you model,
Motomura does not appear to consider that civic solidarity has not collapsed in the face of a
large undocumented population, evidence that cuts against the necessity of the we-choose-you
model for the maintenance of civic solidarity. In any event, my ultimate point is that the civicsolidarity position ought to be tested in a democratic way. Doing so requires “illegal” migration under current political and legal conditions.
85. See STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73, at 34–36.
86. This process is a very sub-ideal version of what Habermas terms “practical discourse,”
a kind of discourse less demanding than the ideal speech situation, but which is still capable
of creating legitimate law. Despite its serious deficits, the discourse that does occur when
aliens migrate without permission is better than if the discourse never happened at all and
immigration exclusion was perfectly administered. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 773
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adequately do this work because the citizenry chose them. Without the concrete
knowledge from experience that “illegal” migration provides, we are just speculating
when we say, like Rawls, that the unilateral power to control borders is necessary for
human flourishing in societies.87
Concededly, tradition and fear of the unknown are appropriate objections in the
face of the demand for open borders. The unprecedented nature of having sovereign
states relinquish their control over their human composition means that open-borders
advocates, like Kevin Johnson,88 cannot provide decisive evidence that their theory
is compatible with societal flourishing. Still, the status quo has an obligation to epistemic modesty, too. We should be modest about the legitimacy of our immigration
power because sovereign-controlled immigration law is such an outlier in the body
of democratic law, and because it causes a serious degree of harm to aliens from
many normative vantage points.
How then to resolve this impasse of legitimacy and knowledge?89 Democratic deliberation and the democratic knowledge 90 it produces offers a way to bridge both.
We can know the legitimacy of borders on democratic politics’ own terms 91 by, ideally, requiring all persons subject to immigration law and called to respect the United
States border to “have the opportunity . . . actually to participate in the political processes that determine how [the immigration] power is exercised, on terms that . . .
are consistent with their freedom and equality.” 92 Doing so would produce law that
could legitimately bind aliens and produce robust knowledge of what a border regime
that promotes the flourishing of all humans looks like.
Back in the real world, one way to approximate this ideal debate and gain some
of the legitimacy and informational benefits that a true global discussion would accrue is to adopt the wish list of mainstream immigration scholars. This group does
not by and large advocate open borders,93 but rather, advocates more limited and

(“Practical discourse . . . is ‘a procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and hypothetically considered for adoption.’”) (quoting Jurgen Habermas, Discourse
Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 103 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990)).
87. See supra notes 73–74.
88. See JOHNSON, supra note 21.
89. First Amendment scholar Robert Post has written that the First Amendment guarantees a politicized version of the enlightenment spirit of inquiry. Free speech, properly articulated, allows “all possible objectives, all possible versions of national identity, be rendered
problematic and open to inquiry.” Post, supra note 11, at 1119. Facilitating and tolerating
“illegal” migration renders the prevailing model of autocratic control of membership norms
and laws “problematic and open to inquiry.” Id.
90. See Daniel I. Morales, Immigration Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L.
& SOC. CHANGE 49, 72 (2013) (discussing and defining “democratic knowledge” in the context
of debates about immigration law)), republished in 34 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 123 (2014)
(Gabriel J. Chin, ed.).
91. That is, without considering the voice of “all affected” by the border regime we do
not know whether the border regime is legitimate in the way that democratic polities generally
know what is good or right. See supra Part I.A.
92. In this formulation, Abizadeh borrows from Habermas. See Abizadeh, supra note 37, at 41.
93. See Linda Bosniak, Amnesty in Immigration: Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, 16
CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 344, 355 (2013) (arguing that very few legal scholars
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targeted efforts at immigration enforcement—including deportation—than current
policy dictates, better due process for noncitizens, as well as the legalization of the
undocumented population. Mainstream immigration scholars also staunchly defend
the existing interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright citizenship
clause, which grants citizenship to the children of the undocumented.94 These modal
views—especially the call to ratchet down the technology of immigration enforcement95 and the maintenance of birthright citizenship 96—in effect, advocate for policies which ensure that the ongoing, sub-ideal conversation about the immigration
power continues and that its quality (the degree to which it approximates orthodox
civic discourse) improves. The adoption of such reforms could also signal the persuasion of the citizenry by the undocumented and immigration activists.
Mainstream reforms improve the immigration debate, I show in Part III, by lowering the cost and consequences of “illegal” migrating and remaining present unlawfully—of protesting immigration exclusion. This leaves more room for migrants
to migrate in protest of their exclusion and to form, over time, an immigrants’ rights
consciousness that can articulate dissent in a more traditional form. The slogans and
movements entitled “No One is Illegal” and #Not1More[Deportation], for example,
are recent products of this burgeoning consciousness and exemplify the power of
undocumented migration to spur protest movements of the traditional kind.
“Illegal” migration also destabilizes the term “illegal alien.” By migrating without
permission and creating lives (citizen children, homeownership) that are indistinguishable from the lives of aliens who migrate with permission—and even citizens themselves—the undocumented raise the question whether the category of “illegal” migrant, and the immigration law power that makes that category, are
necessary or useful at all.
These actions by migrants create a sub-ideal conversation about the immigration

have adopted the open borders position); see also STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73,
at 37 (explaining that scholars, like law professor Ayelet Shachar, wish to mitigate the harms
of immigration exclusion but “want to maintain the prerogative of nation-states to exclude”).
But see JOHNSON, supra note 21.
94. The call by Professors Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith to end this longstanding interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was met with immediate and forceful criticism from
immigration scholars. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 485, 486 (1987) (reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP
WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985)). I am aware of no
American immigration law professor who supports eliminating birthright citizenship for the
children of the undocumented.
95. See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence
and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AMERICAN CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
96. Maintaining birthright citizenship for the children of the undocumented is critical to
the maintenance of the sovereignty conversation that I am describing in this article. When this
rule operates under conditions of undocumented migration, it converts, inter-generationally, a
trespass of sovereignty into citizenship—the highest form of formal membership. In doing so,
it seriously undermines the state’s sovereign right to choose members. It also becomes the
pivot point for noncitizens connected to birthright citizen children to make the claim for their
belonging. Birthright citizenship is a political flashpoint for precisely this reason.
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power that treats the demands of ideal free speech theory like a lodestar—the same
way we treat constitutional commands like the equal protection of laws. Migration
without permission is, in this way, an act that speaks. This speech and the structures
and reforms that enable continued protests (continued “illegal” migration and the
conversion of those speech-acts into a traditional protest movement) partially improve the legitimacy of immigration law and create conditions amenable to further
legitimation, that is, movement towards the ideal of immigration laws constituted
with the voice and vote of all affected by them.
E. Conclusion
This Part established that immigration law is less than fully legitimate due to its
free-speech flaw, and suggested a way that “illegal” migration partially alleviates its
illegitimacy: by sparking and maintaining a sub-ideal conversation between aliens
and citizens about the exceptional, autocratic power to make immigration law.
The next Part further elaborates the speech analogy by drawing comparisons to
the unorthodox speech of subordinated groups, like African Americans and LGBTQ
persons. The Supreme Court modified its view of free speech to capture the actions
of these subordinated groups: our definition of constitutionally protected speech became more elastic to cover their message-bearing acts. The definition of free speech
should be at its most elastic when the question up for discussion is the immigration
power. This is so because aliens lack direct access to the claim of alien government,
the most basic instrument of American emancipation struggles, since they are not
citizens, and because their speech is necessary; they are the only group that can adequately raise and defend an oppositional view of the sovereign power to make immigration law. Unlike canonical civil rights movements, the argument against the wechoose-you model, or for immigrants’ rights, does not begin with the claim that
citizens are being unjustly denied their “effective share” in democratic governance.
The practice of democratic citizenship posits that aliens are not owed any share in
governance at all. To make headway, then, aliens must first destabilize the
alien/citizen binary by unlawfully seizing rights reserved for citizens and invited guests;
only then can they begin to contest the power that excludes in more orthodox ways.
By migrating without permission—crossing the border with the freedom a citizen
would—migrants are contesting the alien/citizen binary in the only way that citizens
make possible. “Illegal” migration is speech because exclusion forecloses the usual
routes for law-legitimating dissent.
II. “ILLEGAL” MIGRATION AS SPEECH
Every time a migrant crosses the border without the state’s permission, or decides
to remain resident in the United States after the expiration of a visa, that migrant
stakes a challenge to a core aspect of sovereignty, the right of the state to determine
unilaterally who may enter, exit, or remain in its territory and on what terms. By
knowingly violating the state’s sovereign selection criteria, the undocumented migrant necessarily declares: “I choose myself to belong to your political community.”
In declaring this, she challenges the orthodoxy that legal and political order, and their
fruits, depend on governments reserving this right to choose for the citizenry alone.
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Undocumented migration contests the prevailing we-choose-you model of political
organization and tests97 a choose-yourself substitute.98
As one by one, crosser after crosser, visa-violator after visa-violator, make their
lives in the United States, bear citizen children, and resist the coercive forces of the
state that seeks to break the bonds that time, children, and other human relationships
attach to United States territory, these millions who choose themselves to belong
undermine the power of selection and removal that the state asserts through unconsented laws backed by the threat of jail or deportation. Doing these things, migrating “outside the law,”99 choosing yourself to belong to our political community
is an act that speaks.100
In this Part, I develop the descriptive and normative case for regarding undocumented migration to the United States as political protest speech by comparing
“illegal” migration to the atypical speech of the Civil Rights, Gay Rights, and Occupy
movements. Through these comparisons, I show that the silent acts of crossing the
border or overstaying a visa have speech content. 101

97. See MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 86, at 103 (discussing how political debate tests proposed definitions of the collective good).
98. This liberal model of political organization tracks with Joseph Raz’s “ideal of personal
autonomy . . . [which involves] ‘the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own
destiny,’ such that they are able to pursue their own projects and see themselves as ‘part creators of their own moral world . . . .’” Abizadeh, supra note 37, at 39 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 154–55 (1979)). The analogy between migrating without permission
and protest speech is also bolstered by the fact that migrating without permission does no
harm. See Daniel I. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1257, 1277–89
(2014) (showing that migration without permission does no concrete harm and that whatever
harm inheres in such act is dispatched on deportation).
99. See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 18.
100. Speech Act theory has eroded the hard distinction between actions and speech. See,
e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 2–3 (1997) (describing J.L. Austin’s Speech Act Theory).
101. Speech is an intentional act, yet the undocumented are often portrayed as mere victims
of circumstance, rather than agentic human beings. My focus on the willfulness of undocumented migration and my claim that these silent acts “speak” is not to deny the salience
of the structural factors which motivate migration, like higher American wages, or poverty, or
violence in the country of nationality. Such structural factors often motivate protest movements without diminishing the agency of the protestors. Push-and-pull incentives undoubtedly
play a principal role in the migration calculus. But the agency of migrants—their knowing
defiance of state prerogatives—is equally undeniable. In a world where 150 million people
say they wish to migrate to the United States, Jon Clifton, 150 Million Adults Worldwide
Would Migrate to the U.S., GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153992
/150-million-adults-worldwide-migrate.aspx [https://perma.cc/4W49-K7D6] (providing several tables regarding migrant workers), and only a small fraction of that population has done
so, it is incomplete to claim that those who are present without permission are simply pulled
or pushed, like atoms ruled by the force of gravity. The population of undocumented has stood
between eleven and twelve million people from 2007 to 2014 after climbing by nine million
persons from 1990 to 2007. Jeffrey S. Passel, D’Vera Cohn, Jens Manuel Krogstad & Ana
Gonzalez-Barrera, As Growth Stalls, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Becomes More
Settled, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/09/03/as
-growth-stalls-unauthorized-immigrant-population-becomes-more-settled/ [https://perma.cc
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A. Getting Heard Under Conditions of Exclusion
For alien government to be overcome—however imperfectly—the excluded had
to break into the town hall to be heard. Achieving social and legal change through
the “unforced force of the better argument” 102 on its own is impossible under conditions of political and legal subordination, since “an important part of a group’s subordination consists in silencing . . . .”103 And even if such groups manage to speak,
dominant groups can wield their powers of interpretation to silence them. For example, the dominant group may characterize whatever the subordinated says as out of
order, or, as Kenneth Karst puts it, without reason.“[L]acking Reason, the outsider is
unqualified for full membership in the community of equal citizens.”104 That is,
where the powerless do not adopt the norms and premises—the language—of dominant groups, their speech can be manipulated, co-opted, or suppressed by the empowered audience that oppresses. 105 Such conditions require speech of a different
sort, speech that is inoculated as much as possible against perversion by power.
It helps when power also lends a helping hand. The Supreme Court’s decision to
protect more than “reason,” more than “speech” that sounds in the town hall mode,
helped to facilitate the Civil Rights Movement’s successes. For instance, the Court
rejected segregationist claims that sit-ins were criminal breaches of the peace—that
they were not “speech.” To do this doctrinally the Court translated the protesters’
mute actions into a “public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street corner.”106
That strained analogy rationalized constitutional embrace; the silent action of sit-ins
was plainly not the speech of the town hall, or a protest march—it was more potent
than that. “The demonstrators [at sit-ins] were not just offering an opinion that they
were entitled to equal treatment; they were . . . claiming their equal citizenship with

/W6XJ-83J3]. From 1990 to 2013, about one million people a year became legal permanent
residents. See Legal Immigration to the United States, 1820–Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/Annual-Number-of-US-Legal-Permanent
-Residents [https://perma.cc/X6H4-HBEL]. When we add the approximately four-million
people who were deported, we get a total of twenty-nine million people who migrated to the
United States over thirteen years, one-fifth of the 150 million who wish to migrate. See Ana
Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of Immigrants Reach Record
High in 2013, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank
/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013/ [https://perma.cc/V7N3
-TPC4]. The undocumented, just like those “legally” present, acted on their desire to migrate,
while others did not; they willed themselves here and actively seek to remain; in doing so they
speak. They speak their disapproval of the regime that excludes them.
102. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 46, at 306.
103. Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV 95, 109 (1990); see also Langton, supra note
40, at 293 (using Speech Act theory to describe how the subordinated can be silenced by structural conditions that prevent the empowered listener from comprehending the subordinated
speaker’s intended meaning).
104. Karst, supra note 103, at 109.
105. See MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 193; Langton, supra note 40, at 293. See generally
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON (1999).
106. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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their bodies.”107 Indeed, we might say they were seizing equal citizenship, in part by
means of a legal breach, at least as understood in their localities at the moment that
civil rights protesters acted. Still, these actions were utterly discursive. They bore
messages designed to resist misinterpretation by the audience of the politically empowered they were meant to persuade.
The achievements of the Gay Rights Movement would also have been impossible
without the will of gay men and women to engage in illegal acts. At the most basic
level, the consummation of gay sexual desire was unlawful in many jurisdictions
until 2003.108 Had LGBTQ people followed the law, never acting on their desires, a
gay community capable of demanding recognition and rights—a gay consciousness—would never have been constituted.
The actions of the plaintiffs in Lawrence v. Texas were the apogee of the political
and legal power that could be mobilized by strategically challenging the criminal
proscription of gay sex. According to a recent account, 109 the Lawrence plaintiffs, on
the strategic advice of powerful civil rights lawyers, pleaded no contest to a baseless
sodomy charge (no one was having sex when the police entered Lawrence’s apartment) in order to convert that charge into a criminal conviction they could challenge
all the way up to the Supreme Court. This staging of gay sex 110 led to the reversal of
settled constitutional precedent, paving the way for further expansions in gay
rights.111
Unlike sit-ins, of course, the private gay sex criminalized in the decades prior to
Lawrence was not labeled speech,112 but the “sex” in Lawrence nonetheless spoke, it
defiantly rejected prohibitions on the consummation of gay sexual desire. And the
predicate to Lawrence’s public staging of illicit gay sex was the innumerable acts of
gay people, sexual and otherwise. These private and public acts spoke too; they quietly but defiantly spoke a rejection of the state’s proscription of gay love. Without
these acts and their eventual publication, the divergence between social norms and
law that made Lawrence and its progeny possible could not have occurred.
To see that mass lawbreaking was an essential and legitimate predicate to the Gay
Rights Movement’s ultimate success, try and imagine a Gay Rights Movement without lawbreaking. No one could credibly say that gay men and women should have
sought legal change by engaging in “town hall” discourse and while remaining law
abiding (i.e., by abstaining from sex) until the heterosexual majority was persuaded—by the words of gay women and men alone—that the criminalization of
sodomy was wrong. No one could credibly say this, in part, for an epistemic reason:
the democratic evidence for the wrongfulness of criminalization had to be adduced
through years of gays defying the law and social norms in the quest to love and be
treated as human on their own terms. It was only when the world failed to fall apart
in the face of openly defiant and “illegal” gay love and family life, when the evidence

107. Karst, supra note 103, at 96.
108. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003).
109. See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT 80 (2012).
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2585 (2015) (finding Ohio gay marriage bans and refusal to recognize gay marriage in other states unconstitutional).
112. The ruling, of course, was anchored in the Court’s substantive due process doctrine.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–75.
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became overwhelming that homosexuality was not a pathology, that the law finally
moved.
“Illegal” migration has been similarly essential for challenging the sovereign
power to exclude aliens. The decades-long presence of a massive population of undocumented people—eleven million who chose themselves to belong to our community—provides a significant quantum of evidence for the viability of the chooseyourself model. Once you see that undocumented migrants are rejecting and testing
the we-choose-you model, then the fact that our society has not collapsed under the
weight of these breaches—of these people whom citizens did not ask for113—provides evidence for the feasibility of choose-yourself political organization. And the
evidence is substantial. Our political system has negotiated with activist members of
this group and bent to accommodate their self-selected membership in our local and
national communities;114 our national identity has carried forward and adapted; our
material and economic resources remain ample; our citizenry is mostly employed;115
the progeny of the undocumented assimilate to the same impressive extent as their
legal peers;116 English remains the national language and violent crime has dropped,
especially in areas with a large population of Latino migrants. 117 We could not receive and process this knowledge of our national adaptability to the choose-yourself
model in any other way, and that is partly why we should think of “illegal” migration
as speech.118
Just as homosexuality could not have been normalized and legalized without the
open defiance of social and legal proscriptions on homosexuality, so the we-chooseyou model of political organization cannot be discredited or modified in the political
arena without “illegal” migration.
The willingness to break laws, and the law’s plastic accommodation—through

113. This characterization of the citizenry’s intent only works at the level of the citizenry’s
explicit knowledge. As Hiroshi Motomura has pointed out, immigration law by design produces an “illegal” population vastly in excess of the capacity to deport. Arguably the citizenry
“knows” just what it is doing. See MOTOMURA supra note 18, at 106–07. See generally Gerald
P. López, Don’t We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1711 (2012).
114. See infra Part III.
115. For arguments on the economic pros (higher capital utilization rates, creation of new
jobs, and dramatic increases in wages for immigrants) and cons (displacement and wage decreases in tradable industries) of immigration for citizens see PRITCHETT, supra note 71, at
105–38. See also Gihoon Hong & John McLaren, Are Immigrants a Shot in the Arm for the
Local Economy? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21123, 2015) (finding that from “1980 to 2000 . . . [e]ach immigrant creates 1.2 local jobs for local workers, most
of them going to native workers, and 62% of these jobs are in non-traded services. Immigrants
appear to raise local non-tradables sector wages and to attract native-born workers from elsewhere in the country. Overall, it appears that local workers benefit from the arrival of more
immigrants.”).
116. See PEW HISPANIC CTR., HISPANICS: A PEOPLE IN MOTION, 17–19 (Jan. 2005),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/40.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYA9-3G9R] (discussing
high Latino assimilation rates).
117. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 251–53 (2012).
118. The democratic informational benefits of free speech informs many theories of the
First Amendment. See ZICK, supra note 79, at 13–39.
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courts, legislation, or executive action or nonenforcement—of some of those defiant
acts, appears central to legal change, and central to creating the conditions where the
speech of reason can do its work. Long before the movements of recent memory,
suffragist “Susan B. Anthony and fifty other women” “spoke” in 1872 by casting
“ballots in an . . . election in Rochester, New York . . . .” In doing so, “they faced
arrest, jail and conviction for the federal offense of ‘knowingly, wrongfully, and unlawfully voting.’”119 Reflecting on the suffragettes’ actions, Martha Minow observed: “the legal system itself needs people who are willing to break the law for
political reasons. Such people provide one of the checks on the system’s otherwise
effective and often well-placed curbs on social change.”120 To fail to embrace these
illegal acts as speech is to create a free speech doctrine or theory that denigrates and
silences the subordinated—who can speak and be heard in no other way.121
B. The Speech in the Act of Undocumented Migration
Speaking to power requires speaking in strategic ways. African Americans,
women, and gays had to communicate in ways that deviated substantially from the
decorum of the town hall because of the structural conditions of their subordination.
Yet, when considered in relation to the position of aliens who wish to migrate but are
prevented from doing so by laws in which they had “no effective share,”122 these
groups had two significant advantages: they were and are de jure citizens (meaning,
among other things, that they are nondeportable) and they are already present within
the boundaries of the political community. African Americans, LGBTQ persons, and
women may have had to break in to the town hall, but at least they were and are
firmly planted inside the border.
The alien standing outside the border seeking entry faces, before anything else,
the thick practical legitimacy of autocratic exclusion and the stunning amount of
force deployed to vindicate it. The speech of reason, urging that the alien’s exclusion
is illegitimate, cannot penetrate the border absent the alien’s presence. The alien cannot effectively ask for an equal voice in the constitution of border norms and laws a
continent away in her country of citizenship; she must choose herself and migrate in
order to gain the standing to speak and be heard.123

119. Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social
Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 723, 734 (1991).
120. Id. at 741; see also Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 6, at 1097.
121. This is a normative theoretical claim in the critical theory tradition. See supra note 76.
However, the speech theory does not claim to displace other theories of undocumented migration. Rather, it seeks to add to them and explain aspects of undocumented migration that are
elided or underdeveloped in other theories.
122. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 59, at 3.
123. Moreover, any negotiation between “sending” nation states and “receiving” nation
states on this issue would be skewed by a gross asymmetry in bargaining power that strays
very far from the ideal conditions posited by Abizadeh or Habermas. And whatever interests
poorer nation states may have in capturing remittance flows from wealthy states, the interstate
system begins with the hard premise that sovereignty over people, and nearly anything else, is
essential. “Choosing yourself” is a nonstarter in formal, sovereign to sovereign negotiations.
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Just as the predicate to gay rights was the raising of a defiant gay consciousness
via the commission of illegal or non-normative acts, at first surreptitiously and then
with increasing openness; and just as the predicate to effective rights for African
Americans was the rejection of their internal subordination, and then engagement in
defiant strategic action meant to speak through distorting layers of power; the predicate to contesting the sovereign right to exclude is illegal migration. Without “illegal” migration, the question of the border’s legitimacy cannot escape the seminar
room and be posed and contested in the political arena.
Even if it seems implausible that aliens actually believe themselves to be migrating without permission to engage in a political project, or send a political message,
when they do so in sufficient numbers, the undocumented form a community where
consciousness raising can occur; their individual defiant acts give birth to the possibility of migrant political action. Atomized across the world, pining for a life elsewhere, the community of those who would contest the state’s right to exclude cannot
effectively form that consciousness. Only when the inarticulate urge to move—to go
elsewhere—is acted out, against the law of the state which the migrant enters, can
conditions for the articulation of grievances against the we-choose-you model
occur.124
Indeed, we are now at the stage in this process of politicization where this oppositional message—previously spoken just through the acts of migrating and surreptitiously remaining—has been made public and explicit. The “No One is Illegal”125
and #Not1More[deportation] movements embrace the choose-yourself model, and
the DREAMers, brought by their parents to the United States unlawfully as children,
have begun calling their parents the “original DREAMers.”126 In doing so
DREAMers explicitly reject the way that their parents’ guilt (for knowingly
migrating “illegally”) has been used to construct the child-migrant DREAMers’ own

Forcing the conversation about the way that sovereignty radiates undemocratic power far beyond its territorial boundary—power that stunts the horizons of possibility for those who wish
to migrate—requires that initial, knowing and defiant act of crossing the border (or overstaying
a visa) without permission.
124. While immigrants with legal status can and do join in solidarity with the undocumented, their privileged status as immigrants whom citizens chose makes it far less likely
that noncitizens with legal status will mount a challenge to the we-choose-you model on their
own. Of course, immigrants with formal legal status are highly likely to challenge practices
that affect them directly, like crime-based deportation.
125. No One is Illegal was “[i]nitiated in Montreal in the early 2000s [and] . . . spread to
other major cities and began engaging in aggressive campaigns against deportations.” CHRIS
DIXON, ANOTHER POLITICS: TALKING ACROSS TODAY’S TRANSFORMATIVE MOVEMENTS 49
(2014). #Not1More[Deportation] has translated the sentiment and consciousness of No One is
Illegal into the U.S. context. See generally #NOT1MORE, http://www.notonemoredeportation
.com/ [https://perma.cc/6VPR-J22R].
126. See, e.g., Cristina Jim, DREAMers to Congress: Don’t Mess With Us, ABC NEWS
(June 13, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/dreamers-congress-mess-us
-immigration-reform-opinion/story?id=19390168 [https://perma.cc/XL4U-Q4VU] (“We are
fighting for our families, our communities, and our parents, who we know are the original
dreamers who sacrificed so much for our futures.”); Celebrating Parents, The Original
Dreamers, DEFINE AMERICAN: BLOG (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.defineamerican.com/blog/post
/celebrating-parents-the-original-dreamers [https://perma.cc/Q28K-73ET].
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innocence.127 If the DREAMers’ parents—who, unlike their children, knowingly
broke the law—deserve the same accommodations by the United States as the
DREAMers themselves, then the DREAMers are asking the nation to validate the
choose-yourself model. If the DREAMers’ parents are not illegal, then no one is.
Echoing the logic of the “original DREAMers” and of the choose-yourself model,
a DREAMer attending Dartmouth College explained why she was petitioning the
college to remove “illegal alien” from its subject headings: “This term, and the way
people used it to criminalize the choices our parents made in order to provide us with
better lives, completely detracts from the brave choices and obstacles we overcame
in order to survive . . . I’m not illegal. I’m a survivor that continues to work toward
a better future.”128
C. Presence as Speech: Occupy Wall Street and Undocumented Migration
Compared
For those who accept the idea that illegal action may be a predicate for the subordinated to engage in the speech of reason, but remain unpersuaded that these predicates ought themselves be labeled speech, an analysis of the speech content of
Occupy Wall Street’s “Occupation” of Zuccotti Park, Manhattan, may be instructive.
Self-selected presence in the park during the Occupation was an essential and discursive component of the speech of the Occupy protest. The Occupiers’ nearly twomonth presence, persevering through harassment and arrests in the center of the
world’s largest financial center, secured the Occupation’s great achievement: placing
the question of unequal economic power on the national agenda. Three years later,
these questions are still being digested. 129 By migrating without permission and strategically acting to remain, the undocumented have similarly forced immigration law
onto the national agenda.
To build the analogy to “illegal” migration, consider the way presence in Zuccotti
Park functioned during the Occupation. Under the conditions set by anarchist political organization, stepping into the park meant immediate and substantive enfranchisement in the construction of the message of the Occupation.130 Protestors were

127. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982) (discussing the wrongfulness of migration
without permission alongside the innocence of minors brought to the United States at an undocumented parent’s behest).
128. Jasmine Aguilera, Another Word for ‘Illegal Alien’ at the Library of Congress:
Contentious, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/23/us/another-word
-for-illegal-alien-at-the-library-of-congress-contentious.html [https://perma.cc/FY9L-AC8E].
129. See generally W.J.T. MITCHELL, BERNARD E. HARCOURT & MICHAEL TAUSSIG,
OCCUPY: THREE INQUIRIES IN DISOBEDIENCE (2013); see also Chris Cillizza, What Occupy
Wall Street Meant (or Didn’t) to Politics, WASH. POST: THE FIX, (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/09/17/what-occupy-wall-street-meant-or-didnt-to
-politics/ [https://perma.cc/22B4-H8SW].
130. The Occupation began on September 17, 2011. The protest was intentional and organized, but in the anarchist style. The two initiators had the goal of “getting the [Occupy Wall
Street] meme out there,” but they did not intend to “control what happens.” This secession of
control meant that the meme, Occupy Wall Street, would be defined and propagated by these
self-selecting members. The initiators simply set the conditions of possibility for Occupy.
Mattathias Schwartz, Pre-Occupied: The Origins and Future of Occupy Wall Street, NEW
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enfranchised in two different ways. First, internally: the commitment to voice
through the deliberative procedures of the General Assembly—the Occupation’s
democratic organ—meant that the views of all present would be considered in nearly
every aspect of the Occupation’s actions, from basic functional matters to the text of
the Declaration of the Occupation (the official public statement of the protest).131
Second, presence individually and collectively is what constituted the Occupation of
“Wall Street.” The Occupation, quite apart from the Declaration, was the message.
Moreover, to keep the message going, people had to continue to remain present in
the park. Abandoning the park meant the cessation of the Occupation and a halt to
its speech.
And what did the Occupation say exactly? The message was really a diagnosis.
The Occupation located Wall Street as the source of the economic malaise that millions of Americans felt in the aftermath of the world financial crisis. Presence in
Zuccotti Park, then, was both the message itself and the means of articulating the
malaise that motivated protestors to join the Occupation.132
Presence in the United States without permission similarly constitutes and articulates a “message.” Mass undocumented presence sets the stage for the articulation of
a global malaise. The fertility of the United States for the contestation of the wechoose-you model is as unique as the features of Zuccotti Park that made it fertile
ground for the Occupation of Wall Street. Legal regimes play an important part in
both stories. While most city parks were permitted to close at dusk, or impose curfews, Zuccotti Park was privately owned, but subject to a zoning law that required
“Zuccotti’s owner to keep the park open for ‘passive recreation’ twenty-four hours a
day.”133 Similarly, unique legal norms make the United States fertile ground for the
contestation of sovereignty norms that obtain globally. Federalism allows for migrants to magnify their voices in sanctuary cities and states, where the chooseyourself model has blossomed, as discussed in Part III.D.1. Birthright citizenship
allows an “illegal” migrant to correct, in the next generation, for the injustice of her
having been born in a country where she could not thrive. Robust protection of traditional forms of protest allows the undocumented to convert their initial act of protest into a more orthodox movement for immigrants’ rights. Crossing the border into
Zuccotti Park or the United States permits the constitution of political speech that
would otherwise not exist or go unheard.
As with Occupy, to continue to protest, to avoid deportation, requires remaining

YORKER (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/28/pre-occupied
[https://perma.cc/7NER-LTU9].
131. On the twelfth day of the Occupation, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration
of the Occupation. The document condemned corporate economic power and specified a range
of ills that it attributed to the exercise of that power. Id.
132. The sense that the Occupation had tapped the zeitgeist and begun to specify its content
was bolstered its first week when an anonymous Occupy supporter registered the domain
wearethe99percent.tumblr.com and it went viral. The publicity was particularly important in
the early days of the Occupation since the mainstream media ignored the protestors or radically
misrepresented their intentions. See Kevin M. DeLuca, Sean Lawson & Ye Sun, Occupy Wall
Street on the Public Screens of Social Media: The Many Framings of the Birth of a Protest
Movement, 5 COMM. CULTURE & CRITIQUE 483, 483 (2012).
133. Schwartz, supra note 130.
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present, and remaining present requires thoughtful strategic action. Occupiers, for
their part, had to improvise logistics: how to feed, shelter, and provide sanitation for
the occupiers. Failure to do so meant the encampment’s collapse, or eviction. Remaining in the United States as an undocumented person requires strategic action
too. Moving to a state or locality with more permissive laws, hiding one’s undocumented status, avoiding interactions with the police, and when and where possible emerging from the shadows and advocating for laws that make being “illegally”
present easier—all these actions facilitate continued contestation of the we-chooseyou model. The undocumented cannot contest the border in the speech of reason if
they have all been deported.
The mixed, inconsistent, and apolitical motives of individual migrants do not defeat the idea that migrating without permission is a kind of speech, just as the mixed
motives of occupiers did not defeat the unity of the message of the Occupation. In
both cases, the parameters of joining and remaining present in a place ineluctably
define the political speech character of that act, irrespective of motive. For example,
I could have joined the Occupation to engage in an anthropological investigation, but
because of the conditions of meaning set by the location of my investigation, in conducting that investigation (in being present over the course of the Occupation), I
would, by definition, be an Occupier. I would, through my presence alone, irrespective of intention, help constitute at least a part of the message of the
Occupation.
Similarly, the eleven million undocumented migrants living in the United States
surely have innumerable apolitical motives for migrating unlawfully. But because
the United States has clearly made their migration illegal and they have knowingly
disregarded that legal prohibition, their act, no matter their individual motives, is
ineluctably—in part—political speech. The content of that speech is partly defined
by their act’s negation of the state’s power to exclude that individual. Migrating without permission means “I choose myself” because the state says with force “we have
the exclusive right to choose”134 and you were not chosen.
As the Civil Rights protesters did, migrants present without permission are seizing
the membership that is formally denied them. These acts are inherent challenges to
the legal and political power that excludes. They are political acts that speak. As one
organizer for No One is Illegal put it:
When I think of migration patterns and how those are unfolding right
now—even as more restrictive measures are being put in place—I think

134. Concededly, this means that the citizenry is limiting what undocumented migration
can mean. But these limitations are the limitations of all struggles to liberate subordinated
groups. See supra notes 103 and 105 and accompanying text. Even so, adopting an explanation
of undocumented migration that is consistent with migrants’ agency and fits descriptively with
the norm-changing effects of their act is superior to adopting a theory of undocumented people’s actions that erases or radically deemphasizes that agency.
Additionally, there is sociological evidence that what subordinated groups actually intend
is largely unknowable by academic (or other empowered) observers because subordinated
groups are always speaking strategically to the powerful. James C. Scott calls these hard-toobserve conversations of the subordinated “hidden transcripts.” See generally JAMES C. SCOTT,
DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (1990).
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that the ways that people . . . are navigating these systems is amazing.
. . . [D]espite the restrictive and dehumanizing structures that are set up,
people find ways to fuck with them—out of necessity but also out of a
desire to not put up with bullshit and seek a better life. People find ways
to take down or go around all barriers. For me, these moments illustrate
really amazing examples of resistance to the oppressive systems we live
under.135
If we deny the speech in these acts of resistance, we deny the voice of the subordinated because we deny the political value of the only manner in which the
subordinated can speak in the sovereignty conversation, the only way they can register their objection to the laws that exclude them, and the only way the United States
can internalize their critique of immigration law. Choosing to label these actions
speech acknowledges the agency of those who choose themselves, while showing
epistemic modesty to both sides of the open borders debate.136
Descriptively, thinking of undocumented migration as speech accounts for the
principal success of the undocumented: getting immigration law onto the national
agenda. Once on the agenda, “illegal” migrants’ actions and words have prompted
public discussion of, and reflection on, sovereignty and the categories of inclusion
and exclusion that it creates. Just as we have been digesting Occupy Wall Street’s
agenda-setting message, so we have been reflecting on the sovereignty problem that
eleven million undocumented have so vividly presented.
As with sit-ins and the Occupy movement, the immigration power discussion has
been facilitated by the way that the mass of undocumented migrants has provoked
the state to react—through a massive increase in deportations, perversions of traditional understandings of the separation between the civil and criminal law, and the
triggering of local immigration enforcement actions, among other things. These reactions to the people who chose themselves have allowed the undocumented, and
their allies, to expose the violence of immigration exclusion and enforcement in
courts, agencies, and before the public. That violence has always operated, but could
only be seen and heard once local and national governments started to get serious
about speaking back to undocumented migrants; the persistance of the undocumented’s “occupation” provoked this exposure of immigration law’s unseen
violence. The millions of deportations effected through this reaction allowed the
undocumented who remained to publicize the violence of the regime and use that
violence to make arguments for a more cosmopolitan—a choose-yourself—sovereignty.137

135. DIXON, supra note 125, at 117.
136. See supra Part I.C. Again, the speech theory is critical in the sense that it privileges,
to some degree, the normative dimension—especially the emancipatory potential—of theorizing over description. Nonetheless, the speech theory captures a descriptive dimension—the
willfulness of migrants’ trespass—that is missing from most progressive theories of undocumented migration. But see MOTOMURA, supra note 18, at 106–07; Bosniak, supra note
22, at 347 (discussing “vindicatory amnesty”).
137. I am not saying or implying that these deportations were just or necessary. Rather that,
as Foucault observed, sites of state violence inherently create opportunities for resistance. See,
e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOL. 1: AN INTRODUCTION 95 (Robert
Hurley trans., Random House, Inc. 1978) (1976) (“Where there is power, there is
resistance . . . .”).
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This is not unlike the strategy of civil rights protestors, who sought to provoke
violent reactions by the state and its officers, but trained themselves to react peacefully to violent state actions. Through these strategic actions, civil rights protestors
conveyed to the American polity their victimization by Jim Crow; 138 a victimization
and violence that was always present, but never seen by those with the power to
change it until African Americans’ defiance forced southern states to publicly and
dramatically demonstrate that violence.
D. Speech? Really?
Admittedly, my argument adds up to a view of “speech” much more capacious
than the First Amendment accommodates right now, and it is difficult to imagine the
doctrine ever moving that much. Still, the First Amendment has bent to accommodate
speech that is not “reason” before, and, as the decriminalization of sodomy shows,
the First Amendment is not the only constitutional means of validating speech acts.
Gay sex, for instance, had a discursive component similar to “illegal” migration
while it was criminalized, and the Supreme Court eventually validated that “speech”
sub rosa by means of an expansion of the right to privacy. 139 We can acknowledge
the speech element of certain acts with norm-changing, conversation-sparking potential without vindicating them doctrinally in the First Amendment. 140
Even if First Amendment doctrine is an unlikely vehicle for the recognition of
“illegal” aliens’ discursive contributions, it is still essential for a contemporary theory
of “illegal” migration to see and to validate this discursive element. By labeling migration without permission speech, however unorthodox or attenuated, our theory of
“illegal” migration can reject the layers of subordination that, for example, cause
many citizens to label migration without permission an act of invasion, or as the state
always labels it, an unambiguously illegal act, while acknowledging the fact that
most of the undocumented knowingly broke immigration laws. Moreover, and unlike
any other extant theory of “illegal” migration in the legal literature, the speech theory
recognizes the norm-changing contributions of the undocumented, the political and
legal work that an undocumented migrant does in the moment that she breaks the law
by migrating without permission.141 We should privilege the speech label over other

138. DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 24–28
(2014) (discussing the way nonviolent protesters in Selma goaded the police to violence and
the discipline that was instilled in protestors not to retaliate in order to showcase the violence
of Jim Crow).
139. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003).
140. That the institution of the Supreme Court may never acknowledge this symmetry or
validate it via the First Amendment does not weaken the point. There are many constitutional
norms that are underenforced and unarticulated by the Court. Indeed, immigration law in general is a conspicuous example of that phenomenon. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court vindicates constitutional
norms silently through pro-migrant interpretations of statutes).
141. Other theories do give migrants some agency, but do not emphasize how the undocumented make productive contributions to the immigration law dialogue. See supra note
22 and accompanying text.
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labels because it acknowledges this constructive work—the way in which “illegal”
migration is not just a problem to be solved. Doing so is also consciousness raising
in the same way that “No One is Illegal” is. Labeling undocumented migration
speech offers a distinct way for an alien to talk about “illegally” migrating without
remorse and in a way that ties into robust American democratic and legal values.
Other frames, like earned membership or forced migration, are valuable and persuasive too, but they have a hard time contesting an argument like, “what part of illegal
don’t you understand?”
But “illegal” migration and the free speech flaw in immigration law are still also
problems to be solved, and the speech theory captures these aspects of undocumented
migration too. The speech metaphor reflects an openness to the possibility that migration without permission is wrong, that it may be that the state ultimately can
properly exclude people from its borders. The speech theory acknowledges this possibility without devaluing “illegal” migration. Migrants are both justified in migrating without permission, adding speech value by doing so, and also may be wrong on
the merits. Democracies may in fact need exclusion—perhaps even autocratic exclusion142—in order to survive and thrive. But, we cannot know the answer to this question on democracy’s own epistemic terms without “illegal” migrants’ contributions
to the democratic dialogue. The speech theory of “illegal” migration captures this
critical and overlooked fact.
E. What Does Deportation Say?
Deportation also has something to say. Just as criminal law theory has imagined
punishment as a conversation with the offender,143 deportation can be imagined in
similar terms. Deportation says in the clearest possible way to aliens who speak by
crossing the border: we reject your contention that you can choose yourself to belong
to our community; you may no longer remain a part of our society; you are banished.
Deportation is as necessary for the operation of the sub-ideal sovereignty conversation as migration without permission. “Illegal” migration without deportation is
just the full acceptance of the choose-yourself model. But the wildly disproportionate
power of the state vis-à-vis the undocumented migrant means that the power to deport has to be dramatically tamed in order for even the roughest approximation of a
political conversation to occur. The simultaneous necessity of deportation and the
need to check deportation in order to facilitate the sovereignty conversation is another way of accounting for the seeming paradox that many legal scholars suggest or
imply some legitimate scope for deportation, yet nearly every contribution to the
literature critiques any effort by the state to make deportation a more regular, less
expensive occurrence.144 Though the violence of deportation may be minimally

142. If it turns out society collapses, or moves significantly towards collapse, under the
weight of undocumented migration, then the we-choose-you model, or something in between,
would be vindicated.
143. See R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW 53, 191–93 (2007).
144. David Martin is one of a few immigration scholars who pointedly emphasizes how
immigration enforcement is normatively desirable. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 26.
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justifiable145 on the grounds of epistemic modesty, the rest of the coercive apparatus
is more problematic. Curtailing as much as possible these nondeportation forms of
legal violence, like immigration detention146 for example, appropriately lowers the
toll the United States’ imposes on aliens’ dissent.
F. Conclusion
The immigration law literature mostly accepts that deportation and migration restriction are legal, but also urges that migrating without permission is not exactly
wrong. Framing “illegal” migration as, in part, an act of protest rationalizes scholars’
intuitions and arguments in a way that ennobles migrants rather than victimizes them.
It rejects the idea that “illegal” migration is criminal, the treason of the global order,
but remains open to the possibility that migrants may be mistaken in their view that
“sovereignty” should bend to the choose-yourself model they advocate by migrating.
In short, the speech theory allows for two things: (1) that undocumented protestors
are not wrong for protesting—migrating without permission—and (2) that they may
be wrong about the answer to the question that their actions pose. The speech theory
holds that migrants may not have the right to migrate without permission, but do
have the right to question the we-choose-you model—by migrating without
permission.
In the legal literature the impulse is usually to portray undocumented migration
as a regulatory failure that creates numerous victims and that ought to be solved. The
aspiration is to have immigration regulation without the “illegal.” By illustrating the
productive quality of undocumented migration—it forces a conversation about an
otherwise uncritical deployment of state-sanctioned violence—I mean to focus
scholars on what we have gained for migrants’ efforts.
Another thing immigration advocates gain by recognizing “illegal” migration as
speech is a new way of engaging in a dialogue with opponents of “illegal” migration.
The speech theory offers a new response to citizens who object to “illegal” migration
as simple lawbreaking. Now we can say the following:
Yes, migrants are breaking the law by migrating without permission, but note that
border laws are very different than other laws. Those who migrate illegally, as you
say, never asked to be born in their home countries and were never asked to participate in the formation of the immigration laws that directly restrict them—not us. You
might be right that we can legitimately exclude or deport them nonetheless, but you
must at least remain open to the possibility that we might be wrong to do so. In any
case, we will never really consider the issue democratically unless some people put
our border laws to the test. “Illegally” migrating leads to conditions where we can
actually have a debate about immigration law and policy that takes into account the
views of those who are most affected by those laws. This is the only way that we
allow aliens to have a voice in the formation of these laws—which again, apply only
to them. So, yes, aliens are willfully breaking our laws, but those laws are ours, not
theirs. It seems right to have a real discussion about such an important issue, and we

145. See Morales, supra note 98, at 1314–24.
146. See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons,
97 B.U. L. REV. 245 (2017).
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just can’t have that discussion under current conditions unless migrants voice their
views. Unfortunately, the only way that we’ve left them to do that is by allowing for
“illegal” migration.
Note how this account neither fully approves nor fully disapproves of migrating
without permission. It neither says that migrating without permission is a “legal” act
in the sense of the “No One is Illegal” organizer nor does it concede that the act is
illegal—criminal—in the sense meant by the objector. Still, it meets head on the objector’s view of the fact of illegal migration. Instead of painting the migrant as the
victim of push-and-pull factors, it concedes the willfulness of a migrants’ “illegal”
migration, but offers reasons, not “to forgive, or forget”147 an “illegal” migrant’s
speech, but to question the moral and legal foundation of the law that made that migrant’s act illegal in the first place, and to question the necessity of such laws.
III. THE PERSUASIVE FORCE OF THE UNDOCUMENTED
The speech of the undocumented has been persuasive. The we-choose-you model
has accommodated the decision of the undocumented to choose themselves to a significant extent. This fact, the persuasive force of the undocumented, is often lost in
the literature’s emphasis on the citizenry’s expanded and increasingly punitive “answer” to migrant’s protests, like the dramatic escalation in deportations, expansion
of immigration detention, or the militarization of the United States southern border.
Yet, the undocumented and their “speech” have persisted and persuaded, despite
the citizenry’s violent answer to their protests. The population of undocumented—
eleven million—has barely budged from its peak. Previously deported migrants continue to return, and aliens with no prior history in the United States continue to
choose themselves for membership in protest of their exclusion.
And these quiet forms of protest speech have increasingly been translated by migrants into the “speech of reason” to significant success. When local governments
grant undocumented migrants driver’s licenses and pay for their kidney transplants,148 when President Obama grants a temporary reprieve from immigration prosecution to millions of undocumented people, migrants who chose themselves gain
indicia of membership—of citizenship or legal belonging—from local and national
governments. These concessions mean the choose-yourself model has had persuasive
force. Migrants are persuading some groups of citizens, and some key political actors, through a sub-ideal version of “the unforced force of the better argument.”
Moreover, some of these policies, like President Obama’s executive actions, have
structural effects that fortify migrants’ ability to contest the we-choose-you model
into the future.
This Part illustrates some ways in which the United States has been persuaded to
partially adopt the choose-yourself model and how undocumented migrants have
forced that shift. Absent the willful acts of undocumented migrants, our sovereign
power to choose members would not have been challenged or renegotiated.

147. See Bosniak, supra note 22, at 347–48.
148. Meredith Rodriguez, Immigrants in State Illegally To Get State-Funded Kidney
Transplants, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 29, 2014, 5:26 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct
-immigrant-kidney-transplant-law-met-20141226-story.html [https://perma.cc/5WCG-P8VA].
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A. Evidence of “Illegal” Migration’s Persuasive Force
The persuasive force of “illegal” migration reveals itself when we evaluate legal
and political developments for how they support or undermine our power to pick and
choose migrants. Under this rubric, the shift towards the choose-yourself model and
the role of undocumented migrants in securing that shift becomes clear.
Let us begin by acknowledging that the logic of sovereignty over aliens makes
access to any and all goods under the control of the state subject to the state’s consent.
And the state reserves, through sovereignty, the right to pick and choose who accesses those goods—territory, education, medical care, etc. Accordingly, every legal
accommodation to the undocumented population represents a shift, however small
or contingent, in sovereignty norms, since people who chose themselves to be part
of our community—people whom we explicitly excluded through law—are granted
access to rights and privileges that the logic of sovereignty says we may reserve only
for the invited.
Not only does the substance of accommodation signal a shift in sovereignty
norms, but the unprecedented means by which those accommodations are granted by
government show just how anti-we-choose-you these actions are. Bending numerous
traditional methods of governing to accommodate a class of people who—in violation of our sovereignty—have chosen themselves to belong to our community sets a
structural political and quasi-legal precedent for similar or more expansive antisovereign shifts in the future. Obama’s recent executive actions on immigration are
a significant example of this phenomenon.
B. The Persuasion of President Obama
President Obama is now one of the persuaded.149 His recent executive actions
make it easier to choose-yourself for membership in the political community. In his
speech introducing these new policies, President Obama indicated approval of the
choose yourself model and made an effort to persuade all Americans of its viability:
My fellow Americans, we are and always will be a nation of immigrants.
We were strangers once too. And whether our forebears were strangers
who crossed the Atlantic or the Pacific or the Rio Grande, we are here
only because this country welcomed them in and taught them that to be
an American is about something more than what we look like or what
our last names are or how we worship. What makes us Americans is our
shared commitment to an ideal – that all of us are created equal and all
of us have the chance to make of our lives what we will. 150

149. Prior to his executive actions, President Obama was frequently portrayed by immigration activists as the “deporter-in-chief.” Barack Obama, Deporter-In-Chief, ECONOMIST
(Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595902-expelling-recordnumbers-immigrants-costly-way-make-america-less-dynamic-barack-obama
[https://perma.cc/5H62-EJAE].
150. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform (Nov.
20, 2014), in 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. No. 201400877, Nov. 2014, at 4.
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“What makes us Americans is . . . the chance to make of our lives what we will”
—a more elevating endorsement of those who choose themselves, I cannot imagine.
It is the undocumented, after all, who contested their exclusion—declaring that not
even the sovereignty of the world’s most powerful nation would keep them from
making what they would of their lives. In this formulation, those who chose themselves are the most American of all because they risked everything—and continue to
do so—without any assurances, just for a chance at the American dream for themselves or their children.
President Obama’s rhetoric and executive actions are particularly significant for
a speech theory of “illegal” migration because they are evidence of “illegal” migration’s persuasive force. The President’s position evolved over time and in response
to his experience enforcing immigration laws, cajoling Congress to act, and interacting with migrant activists.
While Obama has long championed a pathway to citizenship for the undocumented, he also escalated significantly the volume of deportations over his years
in office in a bid to signal enforcement seriousness to the Congress that would need
to sign off on normalizing the status of the undocumented. This play did not work.
Congress failed to pass a bill normalizing the status of the undocumented and the
human suffering caused by telegraphing enforcement seriousness with deportation—
broken families, stunted horizons—became undeniable. In the face of this evidence,
President Obama changed course; his executive actions meaningfully rationalize and
deescalate immigration enforcement and attempted to quasi-legalize millions of undocumented—all on the President’s own authority.
In the rest of this Part, I will show how Obama’s executive actions are evidence
of the partial but significant extent to which “illegal” migration, and the activism it
spurred, has persuaded the President to support the choose-yourself model.151
1. What Are Obama’s Executive Actions?
After years of seeking a legislative solution to our “broken immigration system,”152 President Obama changed course on November 20, 2014, issuing a series of
legal memoranda153 that alter the means, strategy, and substance of immigration
regulation in the United States.
The Administration issued ten memos in all and claims that the memoranda
achieve, respectively, the following goals: (1) strengthen border security; (2) revise
removal priorities; (3) end Secure Communities and replace it with new priority enforcement program; (4) personnel reform for Immigration and Customs Enforcement
officers; (5) expand deferred action for childhood arrivals; (6) extend deferred action

151. My aim here is not definitively to prove causation, but rather to show how migrants who
migrated “illegally” can plausibly claim credit for the President’s shift. Other accounts can then
seek to falsify or nuance mine. See, e.g., STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73, at 225.
152. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Fact Sheet: Fixing our Broken
Immigration System so Everyone Plays by the Rules (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system-so-everyone
-plays-rules [https://perma.cc/L4NN-2ZME].
153. All the Memoranda are publicly available at DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action [https://perma.cc/R5SS-WE87].
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to parents of Americans and lawful permanent residents; (7) expand provisional
waivers to spouses and children of lawful permanent residents; (8) revise parole
rules; (9) promote the naturalization process; (10) support high-skilled businesses
and workers. The bulk of these, as I will show, fortify the choose-yourself model.
The first priority, strengthen border security, hews to the border-enforcement-first
formulation of past legislative grants of legal status, but the increased enforcement
measures at the geographical border are outweighed by the moves to roll back some
of the technologies—like Secure Communities—which facilitated a massive increase in deportation demand and capacity. On balance, then, these actions represent
a choose-yourself shift in sovereignty norms; they make life better for those who
chose themselves.
C. Deferred Action Vindicates the Choose-Yourself Model
Obama’s executive actions vindicate the choose-yourself model.154 Most clearly,
the promise of a reprieve from deportation 155 directly and substantially benefits the
undocumented people who chose themselves to become part of our political community. The reprieve from deportation offers both a substantive and a procedural benefit. Substantively, it offers protection from deportation and the psychological comfort
of a period certain during which the migrant will not have to live with the threat of
exile. This is a repose that the we-choose-you model does not permit—there is no
statute of limitations for immigration law violations. 156
Procedurally, these expansions of deferred action do a few things. They further
root—and with a legal imprimatur157—the five million beneficiaries in the United
States by buying them more time in the country. This legalized rooting is significant

154. See Zoltan L. Hajnal, The Democrats’ Immigration Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/opinion/the-democrats-immigration-problem.html
[https://perma.cc/SKM4-HAGN] (deploying social science evidence to argue that President
Obama’s executive actions are bad politics). That President Obama’s actions are bad politics
underscores that the choose-yourself constituency is the principal beneficiary.
155. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S.
Citizens or Permanent Residents to León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Services, Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t & R. Gil
Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs
.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc
/SRR2-BCES].
156. See MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 60 (2004).
157. The President cannot confer actual legal status on the undocumented. The legality of
his actions hinges on this distinction between legal status and the promise not to prosecute for
time certain. See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, on The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority To
Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and To Defer
Removal of Others to the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. & to the Counsel to the President 2 (Nov.
19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014
-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4A7-XWY2].
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because “time and ties”158 to the United States are arguments with significant traction
in political debates about migration and in the immigration statute itself.159 Accordingly, even though a new Administration has the right to undo the promise not to
deport, or fail to extend the length of the reprieve (should Congress continue to defer
legislative action), the logic of “time and ties” will at least guarantee that any unwinding of these benefits by a subsequent administration will be viewed as a more
violent and inhumane shift than would have been the case had the status quo of immigration inaction continued. This gives undocumented migrant activists and their
allies a stronger foothold from which to protest any rollback.
Obama’s memoranda shifted the burden of persuasion to opponents of legalization and undocumented migration by fortifying existing arguments for legal status
for those who choose themselves and added a new argument: that the leader of the
free world believed granting some form of legal status to a large swath of the undocumented was important enough to risk a major backlash.160 These moves all support the choose-yourself model.
Additionally, just as the decisions of prior presidents to shield large groups of
aliens from deportation provided legal ballast for Obama’s current move, Obama’s
actions set a new precedent that future groups of undocumented may use to assert
their interests. And the unprecedented scope of Obama’s order 161 means that he created another, stronger, “weapon of the weak” 162 than existed previously.
An equally divided Supreme Court upheld without opinion an injunction barring
this reprieve from deportation, but the lower court opinion has been widely criticized
as erroneous. While the decision was a blow to a signature piece of President
Obama’s executive actions,163 the precedent of presidential action will nonetheless
lie in wait to be mobilized by other groups of aliens at a strategic moment in the
future, especially if a majority of democratic appointees emerges on the court. Whatever happens, Obama’s expansion of deferred action marks “illegal” migration’s persuasive force, if not its current legal efficacy.
D. Defined Enforcement Criteria Fortifies the Choose-Yourself Model
The expansion of deferred action has been the most controversial of President
Obama’s executive actions because it is the most legible way that Obama rejected
the sanctity of the we-choose-you model. Yet the Administration’s changes in deportation enforcement practices also vindicate the choose-yourself membership

158. Bosniak, supra note 22, at 353 (discussing Shachar).
159. See generally Richard A. Boswell, Crafting an Amnesty with Traditional Tools:
Registration and Cancellation, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175 (2010).
160. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016); Hajnal, supra note 154; President Obama’s Unilateral Action on Immigration Has No
Precedent, supra note 35.
161. See President Obama’s Unilateral Action on Immigration Has No Precedent, supra
note 35.
162. See JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT
RESISTANCE (1985).
163. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 676–77 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 787
F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
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model and, unlike deferred action, these changes were not challenged in court.164
With these memoranda, the persuasive force of undocumented migrants is now law
in practice.
The shift to firm definite criteria for crime-based deportation from a system that
engaged in a significant amount of untargeted enforcement creates another weapon
of the weak by carving out a kind of safe harbor for those who manage to cross the
border or overstay their visas. With definite enforcement criteria in place, a migrant
can conform her behavior to the executive’s written priorities and have some assurance that the state will respect, in a limited way, the migrant’s choice to become a
member.
To appreciate the import of this change, consider the efficiency benefits of random enforcement in a world of scarce resources. Randomness multiplies every act
of enforcement by projecting to others engaged in the same unlawful behavior that
they could be next. If the enforcement target is unpredictable, then it will be difficult
for violators to ensure that they will not be targets of enforcement except by ceasing
the targeted illegal behavior. In this way, untargeted enforcement multiplies the deterrent effects of an instance of law enforcement—at least when no other countervailing factors are considered.
In practice, of course, the behavioral calculus is much more complicated. In the
case of undocumented migrants, untargeted enforcement on its own is likely insufficient to persuade masses of undocumented to “self-deport,”165 since the reasons
for remaining (family, higher wages, debts to smugglers, promises to send remittances home) in most cases swamp the negative psychological effects of untargeted
enforcement, and the risk of actually being deported (which remains low since the
amount of deportations that may be effected in a given year is a small percentage of
the undocumented population). Still, even if untargeted enforcement doesn’t “work”
in this case, it imposes psychological suffering on migrants who chose themselves
for choosing themselves; by doing so, it operates as a psychological punishment directed at all undocumented people because they violated our sovereignty. 166
With this background, a shift away from untargeted enforcement to defined criteria is choose-yourself friendly in a few ways. First, doing so implicitly acknowledges
that the imposition of a psychological punishment incapable of actually correcting
the sovereign violation—that is, forcing the migrant to leave—is gratuitous. A retributive logic—one which viewed the sovereign violation as morally wrong—would
instead approve of the psychological toll of untargeted enforcement because it would

164. This and other challenged DHS memoranda unrelated to deferred action were not
challenged in federal court. See id. at 677.
165. See Adam Serwer, “Self-Deportation”: It’s a Real Thing, and It Isn’t Pretty, MOTHER
JONES (Jan. 23, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/01/romneys-self
-deportation-just-another-term-alabama-style-immigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc
/SEE3-XXCL].
166. See Julia Preston, For Immigrants, Fear Returns After a Federal Judge’s Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/21/us/for-immigrants-fear-returns
-after-a-federal-judges-ruling.html [https://perma.cc/66CY-4SB8] (explaining that after the
issuance of a district court injunction halting the expansion of deferred action, an
undocumented person eligible for the reprieve reflected “I’m back to this sense of insecurity,
of being afraid every day, every hour, every minute”).
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help to make the wrongness of that act real for the migrant who chose herself. 167
Imposing this quasi-punishment makes the we-choose-you model real even as the
migrant violates it through her presence.
Second, setting out and actually holding to168 definite criteria for enforcement
means that a migrant can conform her behavior to those criteria and have some assurance that her decision to choose herself for admission will be respected by the
state. For example, convicted felons are one of the highest priorities for deportation.169 By avoiding felonious conduct and multiple misdemeanor offenses, along
with the other avoidable behaviors cataloged in other parts of the memorandum, the
migrant can have some significant degree of assurance that he will not face deportation.170 Moreover, during the time that a migrant conforms his behavior to these criteria, he builds further “time and ties” to the United States and thus increasingly
qualifies for the exercise of favorable discretion by immigration enforcement agencies.171 When coupled with the changes Obama made to make these written criteria
real in practice,172 the new policies mean that if you have selected yourself to become
part of our community we have set out a legal framework for you to follow in order
to avoid deportation.
These changes, considered cumulatively, constitute a very limited alien-directed
de facto deferred action, achieving similar—though far from identical—results for
those who conform strictly to the criteria. The clearest difference is that those granted
deferred action have been given an explicit promise. Another difference is that those
who create de facto deferred action for themselves will not receive authorization to
work legally, and many of the ways in which the undocumented seek work (using
false documents to prove legal eligibility to work, for example) can leave them
criminally liable in a way that would render them a deportation priority. 173
Even here, however, the difference in practice will depend on how the agencies
administer and interpret the normative thrust of Obama’s reorientation of
immigration enforcement practices. Obama’s speech introducing the American

167. See Daniel I. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1257, 1301 (2014).
168. The Obama Administration made prior attempts to achieve targeted enforcement, but
was met with resistance in the enforcement agencies. The new framework makes departures
from the criteria subject to supervisory approval helping to ensure these criteria have much
more force than prior efforts. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t
(Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson, Enforcement Priorities Memorandum], http://www.dhs
.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8XSK-CC9T].
169. Id.
170. Social scientists have established that migrants commit significantly fewer crimes
than predicted by their socioeconomic status. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN
CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 251–58 (2012). While Sampson
urges that Latino migrant culture may be protective, that culture may itself be shaped by a fear
of deportation.
171. Johnson, Enforcement Priorities Memorandum, supra note 168, at 5.
172. Supervisors must approve deviations from any of the enforcement priorities. Id.
173. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2012) (criminalizing identity theft); 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)
(2012) (criminalizing the use of other false employment documents); 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B)
(2012) (criminalizing using a false social security number).
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public to his directives was notable for framing undocumented peoples’ work as an
indicia of membership rather than one of wrongdoing—stealing jobs. “Over the past
years, I have seen the determination of immigrant fathers who worked two or three
jobs without taking a dime from the government and at risk any moment of losing it
all, just to build a better life for their kids.”174 Obama acknowledges that Americans
worry about “job theft,” but he emphasizes what economists have emphasized
—migration is good for the American economy as a whole. 175
I know some worry, immigration will change the very fabric of who we
are or take our jobs or stick it to middle class families at a time when
they already feel like they’ve gotten the raw deal for over a decade. I hear
those concerns. But that’s not what these steps would do. Our history and
the facts show that immigrants are a net plus for our economy and our
society.176
If this rhetoric is translated into policy, it means that enforcement of prohibitions
on employing undocumented people, and prosecution of the undocumented who gain
employment through false documents, will be deemphasized, with the downstream
effect that fewer migrants will be deported for committing those crimes. 177
Even absent a shift away from employer enforcement, the undocumented will still
retain access to the growing number of jobs that make up the informal or “gray”
economy178—where much undocumented work already happens. Undocumented migrants who tread carefully can thus carve out a semi-stable, if stunted, de facto deferred action without actually qualifying for that status. 179

174. Obama, supra note 150.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Whether this will happen or not is difficult to predict, but there is evidence showing
that administrations shape agency priorities by appointing leaders and communicating to those
leaders nonpublic priorities. If the President’s public words provide clues into enforcement
priorities that the Administration prefers not to make explicit to the public, we might reasonably expect agencies to de-emphasize the criminalization of undocumented migrant work. If
it turns out to be just rhetoric, it will still have an impact because it articulates an argument for
migrant belonging that has become distinctly unfashionable in politics since undocumented
migrant work was framed as theft in the late 1970s. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1120 (5th ed. 2014) (stating that DHS is an agency that is highly responsive to executive control).
178. See James Surowiecki, The Underground Recovery, NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2013/04/29/130429ta_talk_surowiecki [https://perma.cc
/2H7Z-UJX9] (collecting social science evidence showing significant growth in the informal
economy prior to and during the Great Recession).
179. This does not mean that these moves guarantee that an undocumented person will not
face deportation. Rather we should think of de facto deferred action as probabilistic. Each step
that a migrant takes that conforms to the lowest stated priority for deportation will lower the
probability that the migrant will be deported. And of course, this has been true for some time.
It is the withdrawal of untargeted enforcement that lends the enterprise a predictably great
enough for me to label it a kind of de facto deferred action.
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1. Choose-Yourself Enforcement Federalism
The memorandum modifying the much-maligned “Secure Communities” program is perhaps the most significant shift in support of the choose-yourself model,
and it happened as a result of the defiance of national prerogatives by local communities—such as Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York—with large
undocumented populations. In these jurisdictions, migrants used the speech of reason
to persuade local officials to adopt positions that resisted the national government’s
efforts to conscript local law enforcement resources in service of national immigration enforcement efforts. The memorandum overturning this force-multiplying federal enforcement program illustrates how the local speech of the undocumented can
have national effects.
a. What Was the Secure Communities Program?
Secure Communities was an innovation of the Bush (G.W.) Administration and
was carried forward and expanded by the Obama Administration. For many years,
state and local law enforcement have forwarded fingerprint data to the FBI. Under
Secure Communities, that information would be forwarded on to DHS, where it
would be checked against DHS’s database of 140 million individuals, including visa
applicants, travelers whose fingerprints are scanned at ports of entry, and immigrants
who have violated immigration laws. Where there was a match between the two databases, ICE “review[ed] a series of databases in an attempt to ascertain the individual’s immigration status and criminal history.” 180 If this review suggested that the
alien may be deportable, ICE notified “the originating law enforcement agency and
the relevant ICE field office, which decides, based on enforcement priorities and
other factors, whether to interview the individual or issue a detainer requesting that
the agency hold the individual”181 so that DHS could take custody. ICE would often
take custody of the migrant while the person was out on bond, and localities knew this.
In this way, contact with local law enforcement—just an arrest—triggered federal
review for deportability, amplifying significantly DHS’s ability to know aliens’
whereabouts and activities and deport them based on that knowledge. The program’s
reliance on arrests to trigger deportation review meant that the “discretion that
matter[ed]”182 was the arresting officer’s choice to arrest. Because ICE has limited
tools to impose backend discretion not to deport a migrant that is within the agency’s
sights, an arresting officer’s choice triggered an information cascade that usually resulted in deportation. Absent the arrest, the migrant remained one of the tens of millions of aliens, undocumented or not, that were off of DHS’s radar. The automaticity
of deportation following an arrest also gave local arresting officers the effective
power to control whom in their jurisdictions was deported. In numerous jurisdictions,
officers arrested people for pretextual crimes that would facilitate booking, allowing
the officer to flip the switch on the information cascade and produce a deportation.

180. Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology,
Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1128 (2013).
181. Id.
182. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819 (2011).
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b. Local Resistance Becomes Federal Policy
A number of municipalities found this program so abhorrent to local immigration
and community policing values that they refused to cooperate with ICE, refusing to
honor ICE requests to detain migrants after their release from criminal custody. The
Johnson memo largely consolidates the non-cooperating jurisdictions position in federal policy. Communities on the right of immigration issues will have their power to
dictate immigration restrictionist aims curtailed in a few ways. First, arrest alone will
be less likely to trigger the deportation cascade. The memo specifies that ICE should
seek to take custody of an alien flagged as a “match”183 by ICE’s database where that
alien has been convicted of crimes specifically enumerated in the memorandum setting out new priorities “for the [a]pprehension, [d]etention and [r]emoval of
[u]ndocumented [i]mmigrants.”184 Those crimes include felonies “other than a state
or local offense for which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status,”
or “three or more misdemeanor offenses, other than minor traffic offenses or state or
local offenses for which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status.” 185
The basic shift to convictions from arrests increases the cost to municipalities who
wish to game federal immigration priorities. The further narrowing of federal immigration interest to felony prosecutions and multiple misdemeanors—and excluding
minor traffic offenses—increases the costs of localities wishing to pursue their “own
[restrictionist] immigration policy” 186 even further. Since mere contact with the
criminal justice system will not suffice to effect a deportation, the wheels of criminal
justice will actually have to turn in order for a locality to achieve the deportation it
seeks. As a single misdemeanor arrest or conviction will no longer suffice, a municipality determined to effect its own immigration priorities will have to triple its misdemeanor arrest rate among local populations with a higher probability of being immigration law violators.187 The same is true for felonies.
The memo also changes which institutional actors can pursue sub rosa immigration enforcement. Now prosecutors will play a more significant gatekeeping role.
While there are certainly some municipalities willing to absorb the increased costs
of affecting a local deportation policy, the numbers will be significantly lowered by
this change. The exclusion of minor traffic crimes makes things still more difficult,
since this was a primary way that police funneled migrants into the deportation
system.
Moreover, by deprioritizing deportation of aliens convicted of a “state or local
offense for which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status” 188 the
memorandum cuts off yet another method states had deployed to further their own
restrictionist deportation policy: the passage of criminal laws specifically aimed at
migrants. As local interest in immigration regulation escalated, a number of states,
including Arizona and Alabama, turned to the criminal law as a method of penalizing

183. Kalhan, supra note 180.
184. Johnson, Enforcement Priorities Memorandum, supra note 168, at 1.
185. Id. at 3.
186. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012).
187. Pursing such profiling tactics also, of course, leave municipalities open to civil rights
lawsuits.
188. Johnson, Enforcement Priorities Memorandum, supra note 168 at 3.
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undocumented migrants, and securing their deportation, either to their countries of
origin, or to states and localities more hospitable to migrants.
Many of these criminal laws were struck down as a conflict or obstacle preempted
by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States.189 But some survived judicial scrutiny and remain on the books. For instance, an Alabama law prohibits “unlawfully
present aliens from entering, or attempting to enter, into a ‘public records transaction’
with the state or a political subdivision thereof.”190 Violators face up to ten years
imprisonment, and leave prison convicted felons. The new memorandum will not
prioritize deportation of migrants convicted of felony crimes like this one, since unlawful presence is an element of the crime. The Obama Administration has thus nullified the immigration consequences of these criminal laws, even though it was not
able to achieve preemption in court.191
Still, the exemption for state laws targeting aliens does leave room for continued
state control. For example, in Missouri, a person may be charged with a felony on
her third misdemeanor conviction for driving without a license. 192 The statute applies
to all persons within Missouri’s jurisdiction—alienage is not an element of the crime.
But, because Missouri unlike a few other states will not confer driver’s licenses on
undocumented residents, an undocumented person who drives without a license is
not showing any disregard for licensing laws, but rather driving out of perceived
necessity (for employment, for example) in a context where the state refuses to confer
that privilege on him, no matter what his qualifications to drive, because the alien
does not have legal status. In this way, as applied to undocumented people, a seemingly neutral and natural exercise of Missouri’s police power can, with federal cooperation, turn into an instrument of immigration regulation.
There is room to interpret the memorandum in a way that would exclude such
crimes as deportation priorities. But whether DHS formally adopts expanded language, the thrust of the memoranda, and the reasons for their adoption (immigration
advocacy), suggest that in practice criminal convictions resulting from disabilities
imposed by undocumented alienage will be deprioritized. The choice to exempt
crimes where alienage is an element reflects a preference for nationally uniform deportation priorities. The exception defangs existing state crimes turning on alienage,
and thereby disincentivizes the creation of more state crimes that turn on alienage.
The result is that this category of crimes will not be respected by ICE as reliable
proxies of undesirability for membership.
The Obama Administration’s reform of how it uses information gleaned from local arrests and prosecutions is a pro choose-yourself shift. By adopting regulatory
positions that consolidate the policies of the more choose-yourself friendly immigration localities, and by embracing a form of choose-yourself rhetoric, the Obama
Administration is further catalyzing local choose-yourself reforms. By dampening
the deportation effects of local laws and practices with restrictionist aims, Obama is
disincentivizing local efforts to defend the we-choose-you model.

189.
190.
191.
192.

132 S. Ct. at 2492.
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1301.
See MO. ANN. STAT. § 302.321 (West 2015 & Supp. 2016).
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CONCLUSION
If undocumented migrants have persuaded us to adopt choose-yourself shifts in
sovereignty norms, they have also fortified the we-choose-you model in the most
literal sense: the fence—virtual and physical—that spans thousands of miles of our
southern border is the most durable reaction to migrants’ protest against the wechoose-you model.193 Obama’s executive actions, and his actions earlier in the
Administration, have not altered this dynamic; they have reflected and amplified it.
Additionally, we might see the continued failure of Congress to enact a pathway to
citizenship for the millions of undocumented, the rise of Donald Trump, and, indeed,
the failure of Obama’s executive actions explicitly to protect the entire group of undocumented people as signals that sovereignty norms have in fact moved in the other
direction. After all, in 1986, a democratic congress passed—and Reagan signed
—comprehensive immigration reform legislation that ultimately regularized 2.7
million undocumented people. If executive action is all that migrants’ work has
yielded today, have sovereignty norms really shifted in a cosmopolitan direction?
Even if they have shifted, how durable is that shift, given the vehement
congressional,194 judicial,195 and political backlash? Can the conversation over the
autocratic power to exclude continue in the face of this harder border?
Linda Bosniak described America’s attitude towards undocumented migrants as
“hard on the outside, soft on the inside.” 196 Post Obama’s executive actions, the outside is harder and the inside is softer for all the reason I’ve discussed in my prior
analysis. Indeed, if we read Bosniak’s metaphor back onto the dawn of numerical
immigration restriction and the first attempts to calcify the southern border, we can
locate the beginnings of this seemingly contradictory state of affairs in the 1920s. 197
Placing Obama’s actions in this broader historical frame shows how the political
work of undocumented migrants has been persistent and slow burning. And while
the hot-blooded backlashes by citizens have come just as regularly, the normchanging work the undocumented have catalyzed has continued. It may be unimaginable today that we might “open the floodgates”198 and explicitly allow any
human being to choose themselves to belong to our community, but it was equally
unimaginable that the neo-city-states of New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Chicago, would explicitly declare themselves sanctuary cities—temples of the
choose-yourself model. Now it seems unimaginable that these localities would reverse course and join the Arizonas, citadels of we-choose-you. This history of

193. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV 147 (2012) (citing
Daniel Ibsen Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow: Fences, Raids, and the Production of Migrant
Illegality, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 23–87 (2009), republished in 30 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L.
REV. 547 (2009) (Gabriel J. Chin, ed.).
194. See Ashley Parker, Concerns Mount as Homeland Security Shutdown Looks Likely,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/us/concerns-mount-as
-homeland-security-shutdown-looks-likely.html [https://perma.cc/5MEE-TK7Y].
195. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 59 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
196. Bosniak, supra note 22, at 364.
197. See NGAI, supra note 156.
198. See JOHNSON, supra note 21.
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sovereign contestation by the undocumented is more durable than this Congress, this
Supreme Court, or even Donald Trump.
Moreover, there is a gaping hole in the hard exterior that will be difficult to close.
Though the term “undocumented migrant” always conjures people crossing the Rio
Grande, forty-percent of migrants are visa overstayers. 199 And while the DHS has
dramatically improved its capacity to know whether people actually exit the country
after they arrive, calcifying the soft inside will face many more legal barriers than
building Trump’s wall. The post-September eleventh period, which led to the effective curtailment of student and travel visas, has subsided, and while terrorism continues to inspire fear, there are few serious calls for restrictions on those modes of
entry. Thus, as the exterior gets harder, the face of those who contest sovereignty
norms may begin to shift, but the contest is likely to continue.
The sovereignty calcifying reactions to undocumented migration, real and harsh
as they are, are thus better read as efforts by the state to signify paper sovereignty’s
reality; they are not a reflection of the we-choose-you model’s strength, but of its
increasing weakness. Though the citizenry is not now persuaded of the chooseyourself model’s viability, we ought to start recognizing the growing evidence in its
favor, and credit undocumented migrants for forcing these shifts; they have done
more than anyone else to give the choose-yourself model—open borders—life.

199. See Sara Murray, Many in U.S. Illegally Overstayed Their Visas, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7,
2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323916304578404960101110032
[https://perma.cc/8BRC-JBJJ].

